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ABSTRACT
Spencer, Bryden. A Monte Carlo Simulation Comparing the Statistical Precision of Two
High Stakes Teacher Evaluation Methods: A Value-added Model and a
Composite Measure. Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University of
Northern Colorado, 2016.

Value-added models are a class of growth models used in education to assign
responsibility for student growth to teachers or schools. For value-added models to be
used fairly, sufficient statistical precision is necessary for accurate teacher classification.
Previous research indicated precision below practical limits. An alternative approach has
been explored in which value-added models are incorporated into composite measures of
teacher quality alongside subjective indicators. The aim of the current research was to
explore the relative precision of the two evaluative approaches using simulated data. It
was found that the composite measure produced fewer classification errors than the
stand-alone value-added model. The magnitude of the reduction was largest when sample
sizes were small, when composite indicators were highly correlated, and when using
conservative alpha levels for hypothesis testing. The magnitude of the difference shrank
as an increasing number of aggregated evaluation cycles were incorporated into the
evaluation, when composite indicators were poorly correlated, and when less
conservative alpha levels were used.
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Implications for this research are mixed, but there is tentative evidence that there is a
tradeoff between precision and resource expenditure when comparing stand-alone valueadded versus composite evaluative models.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Considerations of methods for teacher evaluation and accountability are evolving
problems in American education. Driven by a myriad of factors not limited to standards
based education, national reform such as No Child Left Behind, and a generally negative
view of the American education system and teachers among the public (Heitin, 2012),
teacher accountability has become an important focus in the politics of American
education (Cochran-Smith, Piazza, & Power, 2013; Lewis, & Young, 2013). Increasingly
over the last few decades, teacher evaluation has shifted away from informal or
subjective methods, such as principal observations, towards methods which rely on
standardized student test data (Steinberg, 2015). Under No Child Left Behind, schools
were accountable to student test scores and could be sanctioned when average test scores
fell below expected student performance gains.
In recent years, test data have been used increasingly to evaluate individual
teachers. This shift towards teacher level accountability is due various social, political
and technical factors including a national debate about pay-for-performance incentive
structures (see Harrison, 2015), due to ongoing dissatisfaction with national reform
efforts and with international test score comparisons (Hanushek, 2009), and due to
improvements in data collection, storage and reporting (American Statistical Association,
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2014). Of particular note are recent improvements in statistical methods available for
teacher accountability using student test data. Tennessee was the first state to pass
legislation requiring that a certain percentage of teacher evaluations came from student
test data. This was made possible by the work of William Sanders (Sanders, 1999) and
colleagues who developed an early form of what is widely referred to as value-added
modeling. Value-added models are statistical models that use student growth on
standardized tests in an attempt to isolate teacher contributions to student learning.
The use of value-added models for teacher evaluation is controversial (see Baker
et al., 2010), but some argue that the potential benefit of being able to objectively identify
high and low performing teachers is substantial from both an educational and economic
standpoint (Hanushek, 2009; Hanushek, 2011). The basis for this argument stems from
evidence indicating that teacher proficiency is related to immediate and long-term student
growth (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; Ladd, 2008; Nye, Konstantopoulos,
& Hedges, 2004). Good teachers have a positive impact on test scores, and evidence
suggests that test scores are related to attainment outcomes such as college attendance
and employment (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Currie, & Thomas, 1999).
Consequently, there is a precedent to identify and remove the lowest performing teachers
from the teaching pool. Hanushek (2009) argues that if the lowest performing teachers
were replaced with average teachers on a national scale, the United States would be able
to shrink international proficiency discrepancies substantially within a short window.
Hypothetically, gains in test scores would translate into economic and quality of life
improvements nationally. The use of value-added models as an objective measure of
teacher proficiency is central to this argument and hinges on the premise that value-added
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models can accurately distinguish teachers of varying levels of proficiency. This is a
high-stakes approach to teacher evaluation. Teachers would face remediation or loss of
employment depending on student growth on standardized assessments. Therefore, the
accuracy and precision of value-added models has practical, ethical, and legal
implications. Teachers misidentified as underperforming face unnecessary sanctions.
Already there are cases where school districts have been sued by teachers questioning the
validity of value-added results (see Amrein & Berliner, 2002).
Research on conventional value-added models has demonstrated mixed evidence
that they can identify high and low performing teachers without bias (Harris, 2011). Bias
in the statistical sense is a tendency for the model to consistently over or under-estimate
model parameters. Lack of bias is essential for the efficacy of value-added modeling for
teacher evaluation, but lack of bias alone is not sufficient if value-added models are to be
used for high stakes teacher evaluation. High stakes evaluation will also require a high
degree of precision. Without sufficient precision, value-added models will only be able to
identify high and low performing teachers on average. Being able to identify high and
low performance on average is useful for school level evaluation, but if the goal is to
identify and remediate teachers who are not contributing sufficiently to student learning,
a high degree of precision is necessary in order to avoid classification errors.
Small sample sizes for estimating teacher value-added (i.e., classroom size)
makes the precision issue a difficult problem to solve (Baker et al., 2010). A strategy
used in practice to bolster sample sizes for estimating teacher value-added effects is to
pool test data from consecutive years (McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaley, 2009).
Even so, there is evidence that error rates viewed as acceptable in scientific research are
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only obtained after pooling upwards of 11 years of test data (Schochet & Chiang, 2010).
This presents a difficult practical challenge which limits that hypothetical benefits of
teacher evaluation driven by value-added modeling.
In recent years there has been a focus within evaluation research on teacher
evaluation which incorporates several different measures into a composite indicator of
teacher quality (see Koretz 2008; Strunk, Weinstein, & Makkonen, 2014). Traditional
evaluation methods, such as principal observations, are criticized for being subjective and
too imprecise to identify any but the highest and lowest performing teachers (Muijs,
2006; Tucker, 1997) Even so, there is long-standing evidence from psychometric
research suggesting that several imperfect measures can be combined to improve the
overall precision of an assessment (Guilford, 1946). Recent research has been conducted
considering methods for combining value-added results with more traditional forms of
teacher evaluation (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013) and for considering
the statistical efficacy of approaches which use composite indicators (Garrett &
Steingberg, 2014). Central to the proposed study is the Measures of Effective Teaching
(MET) project (Kane, McCaffrey Miller, & Staiger, 2013). The MET project was a large
scale, randomized experiment which evaluated the merits of a composite indicator that
incorporated a value-added estimate, a principal observation and a student-teacher
evaluation into a single indicator of teacher quality. It was found that the composite
indicator in question could be used to estimate teacher quality with a high degree of
precision on average. This was accomplished by comparing estimates obtained under
random and non-random conditions for the same group of teachers. The MET project and
its relevance for the current study is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.
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Purpose and Nature of Study
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the magnitude of
improvement to estimated precision that can be expected under varying conditions when
comparing value-added to composite indicators of teacher quality. The MET project
established that a composite measure of teacher quality can be used to identify high and
low performing teachers with a high degree of precision on average. It was not known
whether a composite measure such as the one used in the MET project could be adapted
and used generally for high stakes teacher evaluation across a variety of educational
contexts and for individual teachers. To address this, the goal for the current study was to
evaluate the precision of a composite measure for teacher evaluation using statistical
error derived from a variety of simulated contexts.
The current study was a Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulations are
used in educational research to inform methodological practice (see Mass & Hox, 2004;
Mass & Hox, 2005). Achievement data were simulated representing a variety possible
educational contexts (e.g., variation in class and school sizes, variation in the
relationships between composite indicators), teacher quality was estimated using a basic
value-added model and a composite measure, and the precision of the two approaches
were compared. The advantage of a simulation design is that a variety of realistic
conditions were simulated in order to investigate a plausible range of improvement that
can be expected when comparing the two teacher evaluation methods. The strategy for
the current study was to first replicate Schochet and Chiang’s (2010) primary finding
(i.e., 10 to 11 years of data are required to estimate teacher effects with nominal error
rates using conventional value-added), and then to investigate the precision of a
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composite measure fit to the same data. The information gained from the current study
informed questions about the extent to which composite indicators of teacher quality may
alleviate current limitations in the application of value-added models in high stakes
teacher evaluation.
Hypotheses
H1

It was hypothesized the number of evaluation cycles needed to estimate
teacher effectiveness using nominal error rates would be fewer when
fitting a composite model to the simulated achievement data compared to
a value-added model.

Assumptions and Limitations
Several simplifying assumptions and delimitations were made in the data
generation process. Assumptions are better discussed in Chapter III alongside a detailed
description of the data generation process, but an important limitation is mentioned here.
Generalizability of the proposed study was limited by the fact that the study is a
simulation. The goal of the current study was to explore the range of plausible
improvement to precision that might be expected when comparing value-added to
composite teacher evaluation methods. Implications drawn from research findings depend
on the extent to which the data generation process accurately simulated realistic
conditions. Simulation parameters were chosen by drawing from applied research to best
approximate realistic data. More detail can be found in Chapter III regarding choices and
justification driving the simulation process.
Definition of Key Terms
Value-added model. Meyer and Dokumaci (2009) define value-added models as a
class of quasi-experimental statistical models used in education to estimate contributions
made by districts, schools or teachers to student growth. Student growth in this context is
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generally measured using state wide standardized assessment. Several different valueadded models are used in practice which vary primarily with regards to the use of control
structures included for the purposes of limiting the influence of external factors
contributing to student growth (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton,
2004).
Hierarchical linear model. Garson (2013) defines hierarchical linear models
(HLMs) as multilevel statistical models designed to handle non-independent data
structures. HLMs are used widely as value-added models in education to estimate valueadded effects (McCaffrey et al., 2004) due to the fact that data in education generally
involves non-independent observations nested within classes, schools and districts.
Type-A and type-B value-added effects. Value-added effects are individual
estimates of value-added for teachers, levels or schools, depending on the level of
analysis. Raudenbush (2004) distinguished between type-A and type-B effects based on
their use in educational policy. Type-A effects are used informally to identify student
growth occurring above or below expected values. Type-B effects are used in an
evaluative capacity as they are viewed as evidence of responsibility for student growth
above or below expected values. Therefore, type-B effects are higher stakes for those
evaluated and have a higher burden of proof necessary for their use in educational
evaluation.
Systematic error. Systematic error in value-added estimation is error which has an
underlying pattern (Harris, 2011). This pattern may be caused by something unobserved
in the model, such as student sorting, or in some cases it may be caused by the estimation
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method. Estimation bias may result from systematic errors which cause consist over or
under estimation of the model parameters.
Random error. Random error is value-added estimation is error caused by
sampling or measurement idiosyncrasies. Random errors reduce estimation precision and
increase confidence intervals around value-added effects. A proportionally large amount
of within-student variation on achievement measures is responsible for low precision of
teacher value-added effects (Schochet & Chiang, 2010)
Summary
Simulated achievement data was used to compare the statistical precision of two
teacher evaluation methods. The intent was to investigate whether and to what extent a
composite measure would improve on the precision of a stand-alone value-added
approach. It was found that the composite measure did estimate teacher effectiveness
with better precision than a stand-alone value-added model on average, but that the
improvement varied across simulated conditions. The improvement was greatest when
sample sizes were small, when composite indicators where highly correlated, and when
fewer evaluation cycles were used to estimate teacher effects. These findings suggest that
there is a trade-off between logistics and statistical precision when comparing the more
resource intensive composite approach to the stand-alone value-added approach. For
practice, this may mean that considerations for using a composite approach must be
weighed against both increased cost and improvement to estimation precision that can be
expected given local conditions.
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Chapter II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Value-Added Modeling and Policy
Value-added models are a special class of growth models used in education for
school and teacher evaluation. The term “value-added” refers to the idea that these
models aim to identify contributions to student learning which can be attributed to a
district, school or teacher, depending on the level of analysis. Value-added effects
represent the quantity or extent to which a teacher or educational institution “added” to
student learning. There is significant controversy surrounding the use of value-added
models for evaluation. Yet, many researchers have expressed optimism that they can be
used as an objective assessment of school and teacher performance, assuming valueadded effects are estimated reliably and without bias. The following will provide an
overview regarding basic theory behind value-added modeling. Subsequent sections will
be used to discuss the controversy and potential benefits of value-added modeling in
education.
There are various types of value-added models used in practice and in research,
but all value-added models utilize the same basic approach. The goal for any value-added
model is to determine the amount of student growth attributable to the teacher, school or
district. To ascertain this value, student growth is first predicted within an organization
(i.e., within a school, district or state). Student growth can be predicted using covariates
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and can be specified for groups or even for individual observations. To determine the
amount of growth attributable to the evaluative unit of interest, actual growth is compared
against predicted growth. The difference between actual and predicted growth is the
“value-added.”
A basic value-added model used to evaluate teachers at a single school would
predict student growth using average student performance on a standardized test within a
school. To calculate value-added scores for teachers, student scores would be aggregated
at the classroom level, and each teacher would receive a value-added score based on the
average deviation of student scores for his or her classroom from the school mean.
Teachers would be assigned scores representing the extent to which students in his or her
classroom performed better or worse than the school mean on average. Deviation from
“typical” growth is interpreted as growth which can be attributed to the teacher, whether
positive or negative. Value-added scores are implicitly normative, as deviation from the
established growth mean can be interpreted as deviation around average teacher
performance within a school, district or state. Value-added scores attempt to answer a
hypothetical: “How different would average student learning be if the teacher’s
contribution to student learning was average?” Thus, value-added scores indicate the
extent to which a teacher (or school or district) added more or less to student learning
compared to an average teacher.
William Sanders, a primary contributor to the early development of value-added
models for educational use, compared value-added models to physical growth charts
(Sanders, 1998). Smooth growth charts seen in doctor’s offices are arrived at by
aggregating growth across a large group of children. Growth charts provide doctors and
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parents with a reasonable expectation regarding the physical growth of children as they
age. Growth for individual children does not generally follow the smooth pattern seen in
growth charts. For most children, there are deviations from the general pattern
characterized by what Sanders called “dimples” or “bubbles.” By investigating “dimples”
occurring in children from the same or similar contexts, one might be able to speculate
about the causes of shared deviations from typical growth patterns. In the same way,
growth in student achievement follows an approximately smooth curve after aggregating
across a student body within a classroom or school. When shared deviations occur within
a classroom or school, there is tentative evidence that some aspect of the classroom or
school contributed to the unexpected growth (or lack of growth). Almost all value-added
models derive from this basic strategy (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Value-added models
vary in regards to how expected growth is calculated, but nearly all models form
estimates of teacher, school or district effectiveness by comparing expected and actual
growth for students aggregated at the desired level of analysis.
The approach described above is a general approach to value-added modeling.
Most value-added models in practice are hierarchical to account for clustered data
structures (data structures with non-independent observations within groups), a common
problem in education due to the fact that students are typically sorted to teachers in a nonrandom fashion. Hierarchical models model variability at different levels within the data
(e.g., variability between classrooms and variability within classrooms), a strategy which
adjusts standard errors to account for non-random student sorting (Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002). In practice, covariates are often employed to adjust predicted student growth.
Student SES, average SES within a classroom, prior student achievement scores, and
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estimated teacher effects of prior teachers are examples of covariates sometimes used in
the specification of value-added models (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Covariates, whether at
the student, teacher, or district level, adjust predicted student growth in an attempt to
eliminate bias introduced by factors outside the control of the teacher or institute under
evaluation. While less common in practice, various model complexities have been
investigated in research settings. Researchers have investigated the advantages of mixed
models which model varying and time varying covariates as fixed and random effects
(see Hibpshman, 2004), cross-classified models which weight value-added estimates
across teachers who share students (see Heck, 2009), and models which adjust for
variability in measurement errors across student scores (see Koedel, Leatherman, &
Parsons, 2012).
Educational Precedent for
Value-Added Models
Value-added estimates are used to inform different accountability and information
systems. Raudenbush (2004) refers to type-A and type-B value-added effects to
distinguish between the different ways value-added effects are used in evaluative
contexts. The two effects are estimated the same way but used to make different kinds of
evaluative decisions. Type-A effects are more or less descriptive in nature. They are used
to answer the question: "Where is growth occurring?" For type-A effects, no attempt is
made to answer who or what is responsible for student growth. Type-B effects, on the
other hand, are inferential. When estimating type-B effects, an explicit attempt is made to
isolate the casual structure of student growth. For type-B effects, the question is: "Who or
what is responsible for student growth, and to what extent?" A less statistical way to
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characterize the difference between type-A and type-B effects is to understand the
different implications the two approaches have on policy.
Type-A effects are used in low-stakes contexts in which the goal is to identify
where growth is occurring above or below expected values. This information may drive
further efforts to identify and understand the reasons behind unexpected growth. Implicit
in the use of type-A effects is the understanding that statistical uncertainty limits
conclusions about who or what is directly responsible for student growth. Consequently,
type-A effects are not used to inform decisions determining hiring, retention and pay.
Type-B effects, on the other hand, are used in an attempt to assign direct
responsibility for student growth to teachers or schools. Type-B effects have very
different policy implications. If the amount of growth in student learning can be
attributed to individual teachers or schools, rewards and sanctions can be allotted for
performance above or below the average. Two factors make type-B effects challenging to
estimate and use fairly practice.
First, the estimation of type-B effects requires that factors contributing to student
learning confounded with but outside the control of the teacher are sufficiently
controlled. Failing to do so can result in teachers being unfairly rewarded or sanctioned.
Non-random assignment of students to teachers is often discussed in value-added
literature as a potential influence on student achievement that may unfairly bias valueadded estimation (see Rothstein, 2008). The second factor which makes type-B effects
difficult to use fairly in practice is the precision with which they are estimated. Precision
determines the magnitude of the confidence intervals around individual estimates of
value-added effects. Without adequate precision, it would not be possible to distinguish
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between teachers responsible for different levels of student growth. Class size is a
primary factor limiting estimation precision of value-added effects for teachers (Harris,
2011).
The focus of the current study was on type-B estimates with regards to both their
practical benefit for educational assessment and evaluation and with regards to the
statistical challenges limiting their current use. The goal for the current study was to
compare methods for estimating type-B effects which may help to address these
challenges. Literature on both bias and precision in value-added estimation was reviewed
in the sections on systematic and random errors, respectively. Before literature on these
statistical considerations was reviewed, the argument was made that type-B effects have
potential to improve education generally if used as a central component in high-stakes
teacher evaluation. This is assuming that concerns about both statistical bias and
precision can be addressed
The use of type-B estimates in educational evaluation is controversial (see Baker
et al., 2010; Braun, 2005; Corcoran, 2010). For reasons briefly described above, the
validity and accuracy of value-added effects are sometimes questioned when used in an
evaluative capacity (Konstantopoulos, 2014). Despite the controversy, some districts are
starting to use type-B estimates as drivers in merit pay systems determining teacher
bonuses, pay increases and sanctions. Districts in Texas, Florida and New York have
implemented merit based pay systems which use value-added effects to determine
bonuses (Podgursky, & Springer, 2007). In Dallas, teachers with high value-added
estimates from previous school years were offered substantial bonuses for agreeing to
teach in disadvantaged schools (Schochet & Chian, 2010). Some districts are using value-
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added effects to make decisions about hiring and retention. In 2011, 221 teachers in a
Texas school district were non-renewed in part due to value-added estimates derived
from student achievement scores (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Limitations in
data systems and statistical modeling prevented the widespread use of data driven
evaluation systems in the past. This problem is becoming less of a concern as access to
complex data ingestion and management systems becomes more accessible at the school
and district levels (Lockwood, McCaffrey, Hamilton, Stecher, Le, & Martinez, 2007).
Despite ongoing controversy, researchers and legislators have expressed optimism
regarding the uses of type-B effects as powerful tools in educational reform and
improvement (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 1997). In a
public statement, the American Educational Research Association (2014) argued that
high stakes accountability systems in general could be used to inspire teachers and
students to put forth greater effort, and could be used to direct public attention and
resources towards achievement disparities. Validity research has supported the notion
that high-stakes accountability systems driven by value-added models can in fact promote
positive long-term attainment based outcomes. Chetty et al. (2011) linked public records
to a data set in which value-added estimates were formed for a sample of 3rd through 8th
grade teachers. They were looking for relationships between adult outcomes and the
value-added estimates of teachers from an adult's past. Chetty et al. reported finding that
individuals who had teachers with higher value-added scores were more likely to attend
college, earned better salaries, were more likely to live in higher SES neighborhoods, and
were less likely to have a teenage pregnancy. These findings suggest that at least on
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average, value-added estimates convey meaningful information about teacher quality and
a teacher's influence on student lives.
Much of the enthusiasm for the use of value-added effects in teacher evaluation
comes from two sources. Many question the efficacy of observational methods for
assessing teacher quality, such as principal observations. Therefore, there is a need for
objective, accurate teacher evaluation methods. Secondly, America compares poorly on
international benchmarks of student achievement creating a precedent for high-stakes
reforms.
Principle evaluations and other traditional methods of teacher evaluation are
widely viewed as subjective and unreliable (Muijs, 2006). Evidence that observational
methods reliably distinguish teachers is mixed (Glazerman et al., 2008). Research has
demonstrated that principle evaluations can be used to detect teachers responsible for
either the highest or lowest amount of student growth, but the majority of teachers cannot
be reliably distinguished (Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). Others have demonstrated that
principal evaluations are often subjective, typically inflated, and easily swayed by
suggestions from outside influences (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). The subjective
nature of principal evaluations limits their usefulness as a sole component in high stakes
accountability systems.
Evidence from literature on teacher evaluation suggests that teacher experience,
levels of training, and prior education are also poor predictors of student growth. Teacher
experience is moderately associated with student test scores, but the effect is strongest in
the first five years of teaching (Papay & Kraft, 2015). After the first five years of
teaching, teacher experience explains only five percent of the variation in student test
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scores (Nye et al., 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). Certification type and degree
levels are not strongly associated with student test scores either (Constantine et al., 2009).
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) compared student test scores of students belonging to
teachers certified through university or college programs and to teachers certified through
alternative programs not affiliated with secondary institutions. Differences between the
two groups were non-significant at .01 standard deviations in units of student
achievement. The difference disappeared completely after two years teaching experience.
They also reported that neither undergraduate GPA nor institutional affiliation could be
used to predict student achievement. Research into the validity of content knowledge
licensure tests have shown that licensure tests are associated with student achievement in
the first two years of teaching, but that the differences between students who fail and
students who pass diminishes as teachers gain experience (Goldhaber, 2007). To
summarize, evidence from the literature raises questions about whether traditional
indicators of teacher quality such as principal evaluations, teacher experience, or
certification status are strongly associated with student test scores.
The second factor motivating pressure for the use of value-added effects in
teacher evaluation comes from international comparisons in which the United States
performs poorly on assessments of math and science compared to other developing
nations. Researchers and policy makers cite international comparisons as precedent
necessitating stronger, more objective methods of teacher and school evaluation
(Goldhaber & Hansen 2008; Hanushek, 2009). In 2003, U.S. students scored below
average on the mathematical and reading sections of the Program for International
Student Assessment, scoring similar to students in Russia and Latvia (Hanushek, 2009).
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More recent comparisons rank the U.S. behind 29 other developed countries in
mathematics and 22 other countries in science (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). A
variety of ongoing efforts to improve student test scores have included reform targeting
per-pupil spending (OECD, 2013), class size (Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 2002), teacher
training and induction programs (Glazerman et al., 2008), and teacher qualification
standards (Ladd, 2008). The U.S. spends more annually per pupil than almost any other
country in the world, and per pupil spending has increased by more than 50 percent in the
last three decades (OECD, 2013). Despite ongoing reforms and impressive per-pupil
spending, achievement scores as measured by the National Assessment of Educational
Progress have improved only marginally since the 1970's (Hanushek, 2009; U.S.
Department of Education, 2015).
In a paper titled Teacher Deselection, Hanushek (2009) extroplated as to how
high stakes teacher evaluation could be used to shrink differences between the U.S. and
top performing nations. Hanushek argued that by identifying and replacing teachers rated
in the 10th percentile and below with average teachers, the United States could improve
its ranking by .5 to 1 standard deviations within the span of a decade. This would place
the U.S. in the top 5 or so nations on measures of math and science. The benefits of this
reform effort are not limited to education. In a separate paper, Hanushek (2011) argued
that the economic impact of teachers is substantial. Hanushek speculated that by
replacing the bottom 5 – 8 percent of teachers with average teachers, the United States
economy would see an increase of 80 – 100 trillion dollars produced over the span of a
decade. The basis for this argument stems from the idea that good teachers impact student
test scores, and that test scores are associated with long-term attainment based outcomes
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for students. Earlier in this chapter, evidence supporting the link between test scores and
attainment was discussed (see Chetty et al., 2011). The link between effective teaching
and test scores is also central to Hanushek’s claims. Evidence suggesting a strong
relationship between teacher effectiveness and student achievement was discussed below.
Nye et al. (2004) conducted a literature review in which they were looking for
research that isolated the amount of variation in student test scores attributable to
classroom differences. They reported that across seven studies, 7% to 21% of the
variance in student achievement growth was associated with variance between
classrooms. This finding suggests that a substantial amount of variation in student test
scores can be explained by differences between teachers. To investigate the plausibility
of these figures using empirical methods, Nye and colleagues went on to conduct a
randomized experiment in which kindergarten through 3rd grade teachers and students
were randomly assigned classrooms. Teacher effects were estimated for the sample of
teachers using achievement growth data collected during a learning unit. For
mathematics, they found that a one standard deviation change in teacher effectiveness
was associated with roughly a .13 standard deviation change in student achievement
growth. The effect for reading was slightly smaller at .07 standard deviations. To
illustrate the significance of this finding, Nye and colleagues explain that the difference
in student growth when comparing a teacher in the 25th and 75th percentile of
effectiveness would be .35 standard deviations for reading and .48 standard deviations for
math. Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) confirmed these figures in a more recent study.
Aggregating findings across ten studies, they estimated that on average, a one standard
deviation change in a teacher’s value-added score was associated with a .17 standard
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deviation change for student math scores, and a .13 standard deviation change for student
reading scores. Rivkin et al. (2005) estimated average achievement gains for cohorts of
students using average teacher and school value-added effects. Rivkin and colleagues
estimated that the differences between an average and a good teacher on a measure of
student growth was .11 standard deviations. Assuming this figure is correct, Rivkin and
colleagues contended that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in teacher
effectiveness on student achievement growth is comparable to a class size reduction of
ten students. Using the same figure, Hanushek (2009) points out that when the compound
effect of good teachers and average teachers is compared over five years, the difference
in growth would be equivalent to the achievement difference between low-income and
middle-income students sometimes referred to as the "achievement gap,” assuming the
teacher effect is constant over time. Importantly, the estimation method used by Rivkin
and colleagues is a lower bound estimate. The actual effect of the teacher on student
achievement is likely greater than what was estimated.
A study conducted by Kane et al. (2008) compared the impacts of traditional
indicators of teacher quality, such as experience and certification status, to teacher valueadded estimates on student growth. Kane and colleagues found minimal evidence to
suggest that teacher certification status had a measurable impact on student achievement
growth as measured by standardized test scores. The magnitude of the teacher effect on
student growth was both consistent with the estimates obtained in the research
summarized above (.10) and a far more powerful influence on student growth than
certification status or experience. Using the figure reported, Kane et al. explained that an
increase in teacher value-added of one standard deviation was equivalent to the student
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growth expected when comparing a novice teacher to a teacher with eight years of
experience.
To summarize, there is substantial evidence demonstrating an association between
variability in teacher value-added estimates and student growth. Drawing from these lines
of research, Hanushek’s argument is that by identifying and removing the lowest
performing teachers from the pool of practicing teachers and replacing them with average
teachers, average student test scores would improve dramatically in a short period of
time. Using back of the napkin estimates, Hanushek claims that the increased costs of
hiring and retaining more capable teachers would be quickly outpaced by increases to
national gross domestic product resulting from improved educational and economic
outcomes.
There is favorable evidence suggesting that reform efforts targeted at teachers,
such as Hanushek’s “teacher deselection” approach, are justified. Much of the variation
in teacher effectiveness exists within rather than between schools (Hanushek et al., 2005),
indicating that whole-school reform efforts would have less effect on student
achievement than efforts targeting individual teachers. Other researchers have proposed
similar reform efforts driven by high-stakes teacher evaluation. Gordon et al., (2006) and
Nye et al. (2004) argued that teachers in lower performing quartiles wouldn’t need to be
removed necessarily but could identified for support in the form of additional training or
interventional couching.
Implicit to Hanushek’s argument and other similar arguments is the notion that
value-added effects can be estimated for teachers as valid, reliable and precise and that
basic assumptions underlying the statistical design are tenable (Braun, 2005). The ethical
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and legal nature of this proposal, as well as its effectiveness, hinges on whether or not
teacher value-added estimates are truly indicative of teacher quality. The arguments and
evidence reviewed above suggest that type-B value-added estimates could be used to
catalyze valuable educational reform. To that end, evidence regarding both the statistical
bias and precision of value-added estimates was reviewed in the proceeding sections.
Error in Value-Added Modeling
The question of whether or not value-added measures can be used to assess the
quality of teaching depends on the amount of error associated with value-added
estimates. Statistical error is deviation of an estimated value from its theoretical value. In
the context of value-added modeling, error is the difference between a teacher’s
estimated effectiveness and a teacher’s actual effectiveness. Value-added estimates
cannot be used effectively or fairly to judge teacher quality when the difference between
estimated teacher quality and actual teacher quality becomes too large.
Harris (2011) differentiated between two types of error in value-added models:
systematic and random. Systematic error is error which has some consistent, underlying
pattern. When unaccounted for in the statistical model, systematic error may bias
estimates of teacher effectiveness resulting in effects consistently estimated above or
below population values (Murphy, 2012). Biased estimates in high stakes evaluation is a
particular concern as factors outside the control of the teacher, such as student
demographics or variation in classroom resources, may contribute to biased estimation.
Student tracking, for example, is a potential, often discussed source of systematic error.
Student tracking is known to cause biased estimation of value-added effects when student
demographics are unequally distributed across teachers (McCaffrey et al., 2004). The
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second type of error, random error, has no underlying pattern. Random error results from
idiosyncrasies in sampling or measurement variance. Random error is like noise. It is
responsible for reducing the precision of value-added estimates. The magnitude of
confidence intervals around teacher effects is proportional to the amount of random error
present in the estimate. As random error increases, confidence in the accuracy of
estimated value-added effects decreases.
Harris further differentiated between two kinds of random error. Measurement
error is error associated with the test instrument. Value-added estimates are typically
derived from achievement scores on state-wide standardized test, and so measurement
error in the context of value-added modeling is generally error associated with the
reliability of a state test. Measurement error is also introduced when there is a mismatch
between the content of the state test and the content covered in the classroom (Baker et
al., 2010). The other source of random error, sampling error, is caused by idiosyncrasies
between samples. All things being equal, a teacher would receive two different valueadded estimates for two different samples of students. Sampling error can be thought of
as variation in the distribution of value-added estimates derived from a hypothetical
sample of samples (i.e., classes). Starting with systematic errors, the following is a
literature review in which the impacts of systematic and random errors on value-added
estimation were investigated.
Systematic Error
Value-added scores are typically estimated using growth scores computed as the
change in achievement across two or more years of achievement data (Harris, 2011;
McCaffrey et al., 2004). The advantage of using growth scores for estimating teacher
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value-added is that growth scores reduce bias when two or more time-points are used,
and when systematic error is constant over time (Harris, 2011; Koedel & Betts, 2011;
Murphy, 2012; Rothstein, 2009). This is due to the fact that systematic error, unlike
random error, is theoretically constant across testing occasions. Teacher effects derived
from attainment scores are potentially biased by time-constant factors outside the
teacher’s control (Harris, 2011)
The fact that systematic errors are somewhat controlled through the use of growth
scores is one of the primary benefits of value-added models over attainment based
models for teacher evaluation (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Even so, research on systematic
errors in value-added modeling has demonstrated that under certain conditions,
systematic errors can bias value-added estimates. Implicitly, the goal when using type-B
value added estimation is to isolate the causal relationship between teacher and student
growth. Braun (2005) explains that in order to derive casual, type-B estimates, the teacher
"effect" must be thought of not as a "statistical descriptor" but rather, a "casual
attribution." The problem with this leap from "descriptor" to "casual attribution" is that
under non-experimental conditions, there is the non-ignorable possibility that growth
attributed to the teacher or school is confounded with unobserved factors outside their
control. Research has demonstrated that classroom size, percentages of highly mobile
students, and administrative experience influence student achievement growth and are not
typically controlled in conventional value-added models (Harris & Sass, 2006). Factors
confounded with growth but unaccounted for in the model may introduce bias, especially
when these factors are distributed unevenly across teachers or schools (McCaffrey et al.,
2004). Without being exhaustive, possible sources of systematic error in teacher value-
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added estimates include the non-random assignment of students to teachers and of
teachers to schools (Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), unmeasured differences in
resources by school, by classroom or by student learning outside of school (Harris &
Sass, 2006), student mobility (Baker et al., 2010), and issues with curriculum and test
alignment (Papay, 2011).
The issue of non-random assignment of students to teachers and teachers to
schools represents a significant statistical challenge and potential source of systematic
error for value-added models (Konstantopoulos, 2013). Rothstein (2008, 2009) conducted
two novel studies to investigate whether the non-random assignment of students to
teachers introduced bias in conventional value-added specifications. He investigated the
correlation between teacher value-added estimates and the achievement scores of students
one grade level below the teachers in question. Assuming that non-random assignment of
students to teachers is a negligible source of bias on teacher value-added scores, zero
order correlations should have been observed between student test scores in 4th grade and
value-added estimates for their teachers in 5th grade. Rothstein observed significant
correlations between 4th grade scores and 5th grade value-added estimates. This finding
implied that under conventional value-added specifications, teachers are being held
responsible for some amount of unobserved student sorting. Rothstein qualified his
finding by concluding that the influence of non-random sorting on value-added bias was
severe only under certain conditions. According to Rothstein, bias introduced through
non-random sorting is a concern when non-random sorting factors are idiosyncratic,
when data are lacking in regards to classroom assignment, and when characteristics
related to student sorting are unevenly distributed across teachers.
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Non-random sorting is often the result of student tracking, parental pressure or
administrative oversight (Rothstein, 2009). Monk (1987) found that while most principles
tended to assign students to teachers in a roughly random fashion, a small percentage of
principles used significant oversight when assigning students to teachers. The deliberate
assignment of students to teachers can result in a consistent undervaluing or overvaluing
of a teacher if achievement scores are used as part of the assignment process (Harris,
2011; Rothstein, 2009). When students are assigned to teachers using achievement
scores, students with very high or very low scores tend to score more conservatively
(closer to the mean). This regression to the mean is confounded with estimates of teacher
effectiveness. Teachers with upper track students can be consistently undervalued as
students in their classes fail to demonstrate predicted growth on subsequent testing
occasions. Further, higher measurement error associated with the test scores of lower
track and second language students lowers the precision of estimates for teachers
assigned to remediation courses and special education (Baker et al., 2010).
Bias resulting from non-random assignment can be controlled by specifying
student and classroom level covariates in the model. The inclusion of demographic and
other measured covariates can reduce bias in value-added estimates to the extent that the
covariates are associated with student tracking (Koedel & Betts, 2011). Classroom level
covariates, mean classroom achievement, and the standard deviation for mean classroom
achievement, have been shown to also reduce bias in teacher value-added estimates,
though at a loss to precision (Protik, Walsh, Resch, Isenbert, & Kopa, 2013). That said,
even when covariates are included, the non-experimental nature of the data in question
makes it impossible to conclude that all relevant tracking variables are observed and
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included (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Furthermore, because tracking is so complex, there is
evidence suggesting that the use of covariates in the model is not sufficient to eliminate
all sources of bias introduced by tracking. For example, value-added estimates are often
correlated with student socio-economic status (SES) even after using controls, and
teachers observed at different time points with both advantaged and disadvantaged
students consistently score lower with disadvantaged students (Newton, Hammon,
Haertel, & Thomas, 2010). Hill, Umland, Litke, and Kapitula (2012) also found similar
correlations between teacher value-added estimates and average student SES.
Unmeasured differences in classroom resources and influences on student
achievement are a second class of potential systematic errors. A case study was
conducted in which four teachers who were recently released from a Texas school district
for low value-added scores were investigated (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). The
researchers found considerable year-to-year variation in the value-added scores of the
four teachers. Unmeasured classroom resources were proposed as a possible explanation
for substantial year-to-year variation. A teacher’s aid was present during one of the years
in which one of the four teachers received a positive value-added score. Unaccounted for
in the statistical model, contributions to student learning made by the teacher’s aid were
attributed to the head teacher. The result was a higher than expected value-added score
for the head teacher. Variation in classroom resources confounded with student
achievement may be difficult to track, measure or categorize (Harris & Sass, 2006).
Examples of such factors include differences in out of school experiences and
opportunities, such as museum visits, exposure to additional instruction and tutoring or
the influence of older siblings (American Statistical Association, 2014; Baker et al.,
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2010). If such factors are non-constant over time, they may partly explain the
considerable variation in year-to-year value added estimates documented in literature
(Koedel & Betts 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2009; Netwon et al., 2010; Papay, 2011).
Research on the stability of value-added estimates over time has revealed year-to-year
correlations between value-added scores for the same teacher averaging between .2 and .5
for elementary teachers and between .3 to .7 for middle school teachers (McCaffrey et al.,
2009). Rankings of individual teachers vary considerably from year-to-year. Somewhere
between one-half to two-thirds of teachers in the top-quartile for a given year drop into
lower categories in later years (Corcoran, 2010; Newton et al., 2010).
Summer learning loss has been identified as a possible source of bias in valueadded effects (Baker et al., 2010; Papay, 2011). Summer learning loss is the measured
effect of summer break on academic achievement scores. Students have been shown to
score lower on standardized assessments at the end of summer compared to how they
performed at the beginning of summer. There are different reports as to the magnitude of
summer learning loss, but consistently reported is the finding that summer learning loss is
most significant for lower SES students (Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2001). Upwards
of 30% of the achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students can be
explained by differences in summer learning loss (Harris, 2011). Because of this
difference, summer learning loss has the potential to bias teacher value-added scores
when the proportion of students in low SES are not evenly distributed across teachers.
Bias introduced through summer learning loss on value-added estimates has been
investigated by comparing spring-to-spring growth scores with fall-to-spring growth
scores using the same cohort of teachers and students (Gershenson & Hayes, 2013). Even
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after controlling for student SES and for student participation in summer activities,
significant differences in the two estimates were found. The systematic error introduced
through summer learning loss could potentially be reduced by distributing students of
varying demographics evenly across teachers (Papay, 2011) or by changing spring-tospring testing cycles to fall-to-spring testing cycles (Gershenson & Hayes, 2013).
Student mobility is another potential source of systematic error on value-added
estimates (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004). Student mobility is challenging for the
estimation of value-added scores because the timing of student transitions rarely
corresponds to testing cycles. This introduces modeling challenges in which value-added
effects from multiple sources (teachers and or schools) must be differentiated. Because
higher mobility is more common among lower income demographics (Heinlein & Shinn,
2000), systematic error in value-added estimation is possible where there is an unequal
distribution of lower income students by schools or by teachers. The standard analytical
approach for handling student mobility is to remove students from the analysis who did
not spend an entire test cycle with at a single school or with a single teacher. Trump
(2012) argues that there are two problems with this approach: a) It creates a disincentive
to help traditionally difficult students, and b) the precision of value-added estimates for
teachers with high mobility rates is reduced due to loss of sample size. Trump compared
different modeling strategies for handling student mobility using data from Ohio's valueadded program. She found that the effect of student mobility on teacher estimates was
large enough to bias estimates and that using a mobility indicator reduced bias. The
inclusion of mobility indicators in value-added models would require that districts keep
and maintain data on student mobility. One problem with this solution is that tracking
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student mobility would incur additional data collection and handling costs, and districts
with high mobility tend to be those with less resources.
To conclude, there are several potential sources of systemic error which may bias
standard value-added specifications. Non-random assignment of students to teachers has
the potential to bias value-added estimates when unobserved student characteristics are
associated with sorting and are unevenly distributed across teachers, when student
characteristics influencing achievement are non-constant over time, and when students
are tracked using achievement scores. Additional bias can be introduced when
unobserved variation exists across classrooms with regards to resources, opportunities
and student demographics.
Evidence from the literature suggests that bias in value-added estimates can be
managed to an extent. Value-added estimates are derived from growth scores. The use of
growth alleviates constant sources of bias so long as student characteristics are evenly
distributed across teachers (Harris, 2011; McCaffrey et al., 2004). For idiosyncratic
sources of systematic variation, bias can be managed somewhat when factors confounded
with achievement are controlled through the use of covariates (Koedel & Betts, 2011;
Protik et al., 2013). The usefulness of covariates for reducing bias depends on the extent
to which covariates are associated with student tracking and student achievement
(McCaffrey, 2012). Administrative solutions can also help to reduce bias in value-added
estimation. The random assignment of students to teachers is not possible in most applied
settings, but there is evidence suggesting that conventional practices for assigning
students to teachers which do not sort students using achievement scores provide
sufficient randomization when a tracking indicator is used in the model (Protik et al.,
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2013). Lower SES students should be distributed evenly across teachers, as many of the
potential sources of bias reviewed above, such as summer learning loss and high levels of
mobility, are a more significant problem among low SES populations. The expansion of
data collection and storage efforts can help to improve model specification. For example,
a mobility indicator helps to reduce bias for teachers with high mobility populations
(Trump, 2012). Finally, the scope of the comparison being made can be refined to control
for unwanted systematic bias. If, for example, significant variation in resources and
student demographics exists within a school district, baseline growth scores can be
established within rather than between schools (McCaffrey, 2012). By only comparing
teachers within schools, variation in resources between schools will not bias estimates. In
short, the presence and extent of bias in value-added estimates introduced through
systematic errors depends on model specification (which depends on the quality and
availability of data), the structure and organization of the educational system in which
measurements are made, and the scope with which predicted growth is derived.
Random Error
Random errors are responsible for the contribution of noise to parameter
estimates. Without sufficient precision, confidence intervals around teacher estimates
become too large for accurate classification or comparison (Konstantopoulos, 2013).
Random errors in value-added estimates originate from two sources. Random errors arise
from sampling errors and from errors associated with measurement. With regards to
sampling error, the make-up of students in a given classroom is partly due to random
factors. Given two different samples of students, the same teacher would receive different
value-added estimates. The difference between a teacher's actual value-added score and a
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teacher's estimated value added score attributable to the student sample is sampling error.
The standard deviation of the hypothetical distribution of sample estimates is called
standard error. Standard error is a function of sample size and of variation in the
population and is used to calculate confidence intervals for value-added estimates. As
sample size increases, the standard error decreases. Thus, increasing the sample size for a
given teacher reduces the confidence interval around the teacher’s value-added score. A
common strategy used in practice to reduce the magnitude of confidence intervals around
value-added estimates is to aggregate across multiple years of classroom data for
individual teachers (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Koedel, & Betts, 2011; Konstantopoulos,
2013).
Measurement error is error associated with the test instrument. In value-added
contexts, state-standardized tests are often used to estimate value-added scores. Thus,
measurement error of a value-added estimate is associated with the reliability of a state
assessment. Measurement error is random. This is due to the fact that the items of the test
can be thought of as a random sample of items from an infinite pool of possible items.
Students in a hypothetical class will perform slightly differently on two tests which
contain a random sample of possible questions. Measurement error is the difference
between estimated and actual student ability estimated using a random sample of test
questions.
The use of growth scores to control systematic errors was discussed in the
previous section. Unlike systematic errors, random errors are compounded by the use of
growth scores (Harris, 2011). Random error (both sampling and measurement) is present
during each testing occasion. There is an additive relationship between random errors
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across testing occasions. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between systematic and
random errors incurred from the use of growth scores (Harris, 2011). Lack of precision in
value-added estimation limits the fair and ethical use of value-added modeling for high
stakes evaluation (Konstantopoulos, 2013). A high degree of precision is required to
accurately distinguish between teachers responsible for different levels of growth. Lack
of precision could lead to teachers who are awarded or sanctioned due to chance. Ethical
considerations notwithstanding, the inability to objectively and accurately distinguish
teachers using student growth would limit the effectiveness of reform strategies designed
to identify and replace teachers least responsible for growth (see Hanushek, 2009).
Current research investigating the precision of value-added estimation was reviewed.
Sampling error. The precision of value-added estimates for schools and for
teachers is not the same. A much larger sample size is available for computing school
level value-added estimates compared to teacher level value-added estimates.
Consequently, school level value-added estimates can be computed with far more
precision. The problem with school level value-added estimates is that with regards to
contributions to student growth, there is much more variation within schools than
between schools (Harris, 2011). This means that while school value-added effects can be
estimated with greater precision, greater precision is also needed to accurately distinguish
between schools contributing more or less to student growth. It is possible to compute
value-added effects within grade levels (see Tekwe et al., 2004). The sample size within
grade levels is larger than the sample size for individual teachers, but there is no obvious
scheme for adapting grade-level value-added estimates for use as tools guiding highstakes policy decisions regarding teacher retention.
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There is considerable variation in teacher effectiveness between teachers. Nye et
al. (2004) aggregated findings across several studies estimating that somewhere between
7% to 21% of variability in student achievement could be explained by variation in
teacher effectiveness. This means that less precision is needed to compare teachers than
to compare schools using value-added estimates. That said, sampling error is also
considerably larger for teachers than for schools (Harris, 2011). This is caused primarily
by limited sample sizes available for individual teachers. This problem is more
pronounced in elementary school where the average national class size is 25 to 26
students (Kane, Staiger, Grissmer, & Ladd, 2002). Underscoring the importance of
sample size in value-added estimation, the average year-to-year correlation of valueadded estimates in elementary school is lower than in middle school or high school by a
magnitude of .3 (McCaffrey et al., 2009). Generally speaking, year-to-year instability in
teacher effects is fairly high, further illustrating the challenge of accurately estimating
teacher effects with limited sample sizes. Papay (2011) estimated that year-to-year
correlations of value-added estimates for elementary teachers is somewhere between .15
and .58, and McCaffrey et al. (2009) estimated year-to-year correlations of value-added
estimates somewhere between .30 to .70 for middle school teachers. Sass (2008) argued
that without sufficiently stable value-added estimates, evaluations determining rewards or
sanctions would undermine teacher motivation as they would be viewed capricious and
unfair. This premise is supported by research across districts that use value-added high
stakes evaluative systems to reward individual teachers. Such complaints are reportedly
common (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012).
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Lack of precision for teacher value-added estimates has been shown to
dramatically reduce classification accuracy. There is evidence that when using a 95%
confidence interval, only the very lowest and very highest teachers can be accurately
distinguished using conventional value-added specifications (Jacob & Lefgren, 2005).
Papay (2011) found that within a Dallas school district awarding bonuses to teachers
classified in the top 25th and 50th percentiles, one in four teachers who earned a bonus
would lose it the following year, and 36% of teachers in the bottom percentiles would
earn a bonus the following year. Sass (2008) observed that across five different districts,
only 30% of teachers in the lowest percentiles would remain in the lowest percentiles
after one year, and in the top quantiles, only 25% of the teachers would remain. Newton
et al. (2010) argue that classifications using value-added effects should not vary so
wildly, as it seems reasonable to assume that high quality teachers should remain high
quality teachers year-to-year, even while allowing for small amounts of idiosyncratic
variation. Large confidence intervals and classification errors represent an ongoing,
unresolved problem for type-B style evaluative systems. Researchers have consistently
questioned whether value-added models can be used fairly as the sole component in
evaluative high stakes teacher evaluation (see Braun, 2005; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010;
Hill, Kapitula, & Umland, 2011; Kane et al., 2002).
Data can be pooled across multiple assessment periods to increase sample sizes
for individual teachers. This tactic makes it difficult to estimate value-added effects for
new teachers (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010), but it does increase effective sample sizes for
estimating teacher value-added effects. Research has shown that by pooling data from
three assessment periods, stability of teacher effects increased by around 40% to 60%
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compared to estimates derived from a single assessment period (McCaffrey et al., 2009).
Even so, there is research which suggests that the improvement is not nearly enough to
justify the sole use of value-added effects for high stakes evaluative decisions. Schochet
and Chiang (2010) simulated achievement data and fit a conventional value-added model
in order to test how many years of data would be required to estimate teacher valueadded effects using type I and type II error rates at levels commonly accepted as adequate
in scientific research. They found that when using three years of data, 1 in 4 teachers who
were average would be misclassified as among the highest or lowest performing teachers.
Similarly, they found that 1 in 4 of the highest or lowest performing teachers would be
misclassified as average. Furthermore, they observed diminishing returns on
improvements to type-I errors gained from pooling data beyond three years. In total, 10
years of data would be required to reduce classification error rates by half. Eleven years
of data would be required to achieve type I error rates of .05 and type II error rates of .20.
Schochet and Chiang's findings are likely understated due to the fact that they simulated
data under somewhat idealistic conditions (e.g., random assignment of teachers to
students and no student mobility).
It is important to note that Schochet and Chiang compared both standard ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation and Empirical Bayes estimation techniques. Empirical
Bayes estimation adjusts for estimated sampling error by “shrinking” estimates with low
sample sizes to the mean (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Empirical Bayes estimation is a
conservative approach which essentially favors the group average over the sample
average when estimating individual effects for teachers with small sample sizes
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). While the use of Empirical Bayes estimations has been
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shown to reduce sampling error (Chetty et al., 2011), it also results in increased type II
error rates. In the context of value-added modeling, this means that teachers with small
classes contributing significantly above or below the average to student learning will be
classified as average more often under Empirical Bayes estimation than under OLS
estimation. Whether or not Empirical Bayes estimation offers a realistic solution to the
precision problem depends somewhat on the perspectives of different stakeholders.
Schochet and Chiang argued that teachers likely view more conservative estimates as
more fair, as the risk of a teacher being unfairly punished is reduced. On the other hand,
one could argue that teachers with small classroom sizes would have less opportunity to
earn rewards. Parents and administrators might worry that Empirical Bayes estimation
will decrease the ability to identify underperforming teachers. The views of different
stakeholders was discussed while considering the results of the current study in Chapter
V.
Instability and imprecision of teacher value-added estimates may also be due in
part to the fact that achievement data are susceptible to non-persistent types of random
error. Kane et al. (2002) talked about non-persistent types of variation as “other”
variation. Other variation has the same practical effect on the precision of value added
estimates as sampling error. Examples of “other” types of variation discussed by Kane et
al. included variation in weather patterns, variation in teacher-student dynamics from
year-to-year, or variations in routine and setting, such as school-wide remodeling
projects. Using standardized test data from North Carolina and California, Kane et al.
estimated that 50 to 80 percent of the change in mean fourth grade scores was nonpersistent. That is, changes in mean scores were due to "sampling variation or some other
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non-persistent cause." (Kane et al., 2002, p. 248). The combination of sampling error and
other, more difficult to track types of errors contributed to large confidence errors around
estimates of teacher value added. To illustrate, the amount of variability in student
achievement scores attributable to within-classroom student variability ranges from 80 to
92 percent (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). In comparison, the amount of variability in
student achievement scores explained by the combined variability of teacher and school
value-added effects is around 5 to 8 percent. Because of the wide discrepancy in the
variation of student growth attributable to the teacher and to sources outside the control
of the teacher, estimating teacher value-added effects requires large sample sizes to
effectively cut through the substantial amount of noise caused by sampling and
idiosyncratic errors. And as demonstrated by the simulation research of Schochet and
Chiang, the effective sample size required appears to exceed practical limitations.
Measurement error. Teacher and school value-added effects are estimated using
achievement data typically measured using state-wide standardized assessment.
Measurement error is error associated with state tests or with differences between test
content and instruction. Measurement error is considered random. This is because the
items on a test are part of a hypothetical pool of items. Thus, the items on a given test are
a sample of possible items, and there is a certain amount of random error introduced as a
consequence. Research has been conducted investigating aspects of measurement error
and the statistical properties of value-added models. There is evidence that teacher effects
derived from conventional value-added are sensitive to violated assumptions when
scaling achievement measures vertically (Ballou, 2009) and when aligning achievement
measures horizontally (Lockwood et al., 2007; Newton et al., 2010; Papay, 2011).
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Hypothetically, if a teacher's value-added score is stable over time, then estimates of
teacher value-added should not be affected by test scaling or to the use of different
achievement measures. An effective teacher should be labeled effective, regardless of
how the test scores are scaled or which test is used. This research demonstrated that
value-added effects are not independent from the measurement and that measurement
error is a threat to both the precision and validity of value-added effects.
Measurement error is relatively small for most state standardized tests. For
example, Chronbach’s alpha for the Transitional Colorado Assessment Program ranged
from .87 to .95 across subscales and has an average of .92 (Colorado Department of
Education, 2012). Even so, there is evidence that measurement error in small degrees can
reduce the precision of value-added estimates (Harris, 2011; Koedel et al., 2012). One
concern is the fact that measurement error is not evenly distributed for all test takers.
Measurement error is larger for students closer to the tails of an achievement distribution
(Simon, Ercikan, & Rousseau, 2012). This means that while the average reliability for
standardized tests is high, the reliability of scores within a given classroom may be low,
especially if a classroom has a high concentration of students in the upper or lower
achievement percentiles. This is supported by research in which higher within-class
achievement variability is present in classrooms with lower achieving students (Baker et
al., 2010). Koedel et al. (2012) investigated both the impact of measurement error on
teacher value-added estimates and potential modeling solutions for handling test
measurement error. They conducted a simulation to evaluate different modeling solutions
and then applied their findings to state-wide achievement data obtained from Missouri.
They found that by including information about measurement error in their model,
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teacher value-added estimates were estimated more efficiently. Using sample size as a
benchmark for comparison, they found that the gains in efficiency were roughly equal to
an increase in classroom sample size of 11 to 17 percent. Their findings indicated that
while test measurement error is slight compared to other random sources of error, it does
contribute to the imprecision of teacher value-added estimates and can be alleviated
somewhat by including information about measurement error in the model.
Test scaling has also been researched as another potential source of measurement
error. Achievement growth data are derived from the use of different tests at different
grade levels. Value-added models typically assume that achievement data used to
generate value-added estimates comes from a common, interval level scale (Ballou, 2009;
Braun, 2005). Vertical scaling is a process by which tests at different grade levels are
placed on a common scale. The basic strategy involves the use of common items which
can be used to equate tests at adjacent grade levels. Braun (2005) argued that vertical
scaling is at best a workable assumption when looking at no more than two adjacent
grades, and that test validity suffers when raw achievement scores are converted to a
common scale. To the extent that scaling assumptions are violated and achievement data
should be more appropriately treated as ordinal, inferential errors are possible. To test
this possibility, Ballou (2009) conducted a sensitivity analysis comparing the results of
two different models fit to the same achievement data. In one model, the data were
assumed to be interval and in the other, data were assumed to be ordinal. Ballou found
that when comparing the two approaches, only 40 percent of the teachers in the top and
bottom quartiles of the estimated value-added distributions were consistent. Ballou's
finding suggested that assumptions underlying typical scaling procedures may not be
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appropriate for data in achievement contexts. Inferential errors may result from
unexamined assumptions typically ignored in practice.
Summary of Research on
Errors in Value-Added
If value added modeling is to be used as a key piece of information driving high
stakes teacher evaluation akin to proposals made by Hanushek (2009) and others,
statistical accuracy and bias are non-trivial concerns. To that end, the literature reviewed
thus far indicated somewhat mixed evidence with regards to bias and fairly conclusive
evidence with regards to precision. With regards to bias, various studies indicated that
bias caused by student tracking and by unevenly distributed student demographics across
classrooms remains a problem for teacher value-added estimation (McCaffrey et al.,
2004; Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), even when typically available controls are
employed (Newton et al., 2010; Hill et al. , 2011). Other studies were more favorable
indicating that bias is sufficiently reduced when controls are used which account for
student tracking, student mobility, and the distribution of student demographics (Mihaly
et al., 2013; Trump, 2012). There is evidence that bias can be managed through
administrative means, such as by distributing students of different ability ranges across
teachers (Rothstein, 2009), by comparing students using fall-to-spring testing cycles
(Gershenson & Hayes, 2013), and by restricting the scope of the comparison between
teachers to within individual schools (McCaffrey, 2012).
The research on the accuracy of value added estimation is less qualified in
comparison. Current evidence suggested that there is a high degree of instability in
teacher value-added estimates from year-to-year (Kane & Staiger, 2008; McCaffrey et al.,
2009; Papay, 2011; Sass, 2008). Instability in teacher estimates is caused by a
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combination of sampling error and other types of idiosyncratic variation at the student
level (Kane & Staiger, 2008). Increasing the sample size for individual teachers by using
multiple years of data to estimate teacher effects reduces sampling error, but to achieve
type-I and type-II error rates comparable to those used in scientific research, upwards to
10 to 11 years of data would be required (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). Lack of precision in
value-added estimation is an ongoing practical and ethical hurdle if value-added
estimates are to be used to identify and then either remove or remediate the lowest
performing teachers from the teaching pool.
Systemic Consideration of Value-Added
In addition to the statistical challenges summarized above, there is a general
distrust of value-added estimation among practicing educators. This distrust represents a
second class of practical problems associated with the use of value-added modeling in
high stakes evaluation. Invested parties have been careful to point out that even in the
best of circumstances in which estimates are unbiased, stable and precise, there may be
unintended consequences associated with their use (American Statistical Association,
2014). The goal when using type-B effects is to improve education through
accountability and objective teacher and school evaluation. Whether or not that goal can
be achieved depends not only on the validity of the estimates themselves but also on how
educational communities perceive and react to an accountability system driven by student
achievement scores. Regarding the use of value-added estimates in high stakes decision
making, the American Statistical Association (2014) commented in a public statement:
"Perceptions of transparency, fairness and credibility will be crucial in determining the
degree of success of the system as a whole…and how the educator labor market will
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respond." There is evidence, for example, that changes to accountability systems in the
last decade have influenced the amount of time teachers spend drilling test taking skills,
using worksheets and practice tests, and teaching a narrow set of curricular standards
(Volante, 2004). Type-B effects raise the stakes for teachers and schools by aligning
rewards and sanctions with student achievement.
As part of the Texas Educator Excellence Fund, merit-based pay has been tied to
value-added estimates for several years in Texas (Podgursky, & Springer, 2007). Twohundred and thirty million dollars are allocated annually between districts meeting certain
criteria with the stipulation that 60 percent of money is awarded to teachers based on
student growth (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Teachers were reported to have
expressed skepticism regarding the fairness of the system due to low stability of valueadded estimates from year-to-year. Teachers compared earning a bonus as similar to
winning the lottery. High value-added scores were attributed to chance. On the other
hand, teachers attributed low scores to the composition of students in their classes. There
was also the expressed fear that teachers would be at a disadvantage for teaching content
outside the prescribed curriculum. For some, there was a sentiment that cooperation was
disincentivized due to the normative nature of value-added modeling. Teachers working
in teams and teachers with student teachers expressed concern that they may be
accountable for the performance of others. Teachers also reported hesitation to teach
gifted students fearing that gifted students have less room to grow. Regardless of whether
these perceptions are valid, a general belief that the system does not work has the
potential to undermine its effectiveness if value-added estimates are intended to provide
incentive and motivation for effort. Other research has shown that in some cases, teachers

44
react more favorably to merit based pay systems (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993), but no
known study has been found which reports a generally positive sentiment among teachers
where value-added estimates serve as the primary tool determining awards or sanctions.
Teacher perceptions of fairness and credibility notwithstanding, there are other
more systemic concerns surrounding the use of type-B value-added estimates. Research
from value-added accountability systems in New York has shown that value-added
estimates may trump other evaluative tools. Administrators have been shown to provide
negative leaning teacher evaluations for teachers who have received poor value-added
scores in prior years (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Schools with low value-added
estimates have experienced difficulties with staffing possibly due to fear among
applicants that they may receive low ratings, and real-estate agencies have started
providing customers with school value-added estimates (American Statistical
Association, 2014). Even before the introduction of high stakes accountability systems,
there has been concerns that even low stakes accountability systems tend to narrow
curricular focus and resource distribution (Koretz, 2008). Such tendencies may become
even more pronounced under high stakes accountability systems. Finally, it is not clear
that feedback from value-added models can be used consistently to improve instruction.
Under some of the more popular value-added systems, teachers do not receive ratings
until summer. In one study, 55 percent of teachers from a Texas district expressed
difficulty interpreting results (Harris, 2011), and this may be attributable to a lack of
training for both administrators and teachers. Additional training will require additional
funding, a requirement that might tax the capabilities of less wealthy districts.
Additionally, only a limited number of subjects taught in primary and secondary schools
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are actually tested in most state assessments (Cimbricz, 2002). For most states, only a
third of school subjects taught are covered on the state exam (Harris, 2011). Finally, there
is no evidence that teachers removed through the use of value-added estimates will be
replaced with more effective teachers (Baker et al., 2010).
Composite Measures of Teacher Evaluation
Given the combined statistical and practical concerns surrounding the use of value
models for high stakes teacher evaluation, there is a general consensus among researchers
that value-added estimates should not be used as the sole piece of information guiding
policy decisions (see American Statistical Association, 2014; Raudenbush, 2004; Rubin,
Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004). The basic argument is that value-added estimates in their
current states provide useful information about both instructional quality and student
growth but that value-added estimates are noisy, potentially biased and generally
distrusted by educators. Therefore, they should not be the last word on teacher quality.
Rather, value-added estimates should be used to identify and direct ongoing, coordinated
teacher evaluation efforts. Betebenner, Wenning, and Briggs (2011) dubbed this
particular use of value-added estimates the “shoe-leather approach.” The intent behind
the name is that once identified through value-added effects, potentially underperforming
classrooms or schools should be visited in an attempt to understand the nature of the
problem through other qualitative or quantitative means. Compared to systems which use
value-added estimates as a sole or primary component in teacher evaluation, the shoeleather approach is more rigorous and has better ecological validity. It does not, however,
solve problems associated with biased evaluators, and, as mentioned in the preceding
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sections, once identified as underperforming, evaluators tend to view teachers more
negatively (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012).
An alternative approach incorporates type-B value-added estimates into a
composite measure of teacher effectiveness. Instead of using value-added estimates to
identify teachers for further evaluation, all teachers would receive the same rigorous
evaluative program comprised of various quantitative measures. A notable example of
this approach comes from a study conducted by Kane et al. (2013). Kane and his
colleagues designed the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) system which
incorporated value-added estimates, student surveys and classroom observations into a
composite measure of teacher quality. Results from the MET project are discussed below
in which the argument is made that a composite measure of teacher effectiveness could
be used to resolve the two main problems with evaluation systems driven by value-added
model: accuracy and perceived fairness. First, evidence is discussed with regards to both
principal evaluations and student surveys of teacher effectiveness to argue that neither
form of evaluation could serve as a sole indicator of teacher quality.
Principal evaluations. One of the reasons researchers and evaluators gravitated
towards value-added measures originally was the fact that traditional methods of teacher
evaluation were subjective and unreliable. Tucker (1997) found that most teacher ranked
using principal evaluations rank as performing higher than average. Sarcastically, Tucker
described principal evaluations as having a “Lake Wobegon Effect” effect. The Lake
Wobegon Effect is a tongue and cheek reference to the show “Prairie Home Companion”
in which the fictional town of Lake Wobegon is described as a place where everyone
living there is above average. Muijs (2006) argued that problems with principal
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evaluations stem from the fact that they are often artificial and lack methodological rigor
and that the conflicting role of principals in which they are both leader and evaluator may
explain some of the favorable bias. Evidence from empirical research supports the notion
that principal evaluations are poor predictors of student achievement. Using three
different samples of principals from school districts in Cincinnati, Milanowski (2004)
observed correlations averaging around .30 between standardized teacher evaluations and
student achievement scores on a standardized assessment. While the correlation is
moderately positive, the sample of evaluators used in the research were trained in the use
of a well-researched, standardized measure. Thus, the estimates from Milanowski’s
research may be upper bound compared to estimates from educational settings in which
evaluators use self-made measures. Lower estimates were obtained in earlier research in
which the correlations between principal evaluations and student achievement on tests of
math and reading were around .20 (Medley & Coker, 1987).
Student-Teacher ratings. There is evidence that student-led evaluations of
teacher quality are more reliable than principal evaluations (Peterson, Wahlquist, &
Bone, 2000). That said, student evaluations have similar problems. Interrater reliability
between single-students in the same class averages around .20 (Marsh, 1984), suggesting
that there is significant variability in how individual students rate teachers. With 50 or
more students, inter-rater reliability is reasonable high on average (r = .95), but most
primary classrooms do not approach 50 students. At the university level, student level
evaluations are common (Krautmann & Sander, 1999). University students are arguably
better judges of teacher performance compared to students in primary grades given their
additional years of educational experience. Yet, there is evidence suggesting that student
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based evaluations of teachers at the university level reflect student grades and or course
difficulty more-so than teacher quality (Krautmann & Sander, 1999; Centra, 2003), and
are confounded with the gender of the instructor (Basow & Silberg, 1987). There is
evidence that the quality of surveys results depends on the survey itself, the training
students receive regarding the use of the survey, and the emphasis placed on the
importance of the evaluation by the teacher under review (Marsh, 1984). A meta-analysis
on the validity of student instructor ratings found a correlation of .43 between instructor
ratings and student achievement (Cohen, 1981). This analysis suggests a moderate to
strong relationship between student ratings and instructor quality, but as with the research
summarized above, the effect of the relationship between teacher rating and student
achievement was confounded with student grades. In sum, there is mixed evidence that,
at the university level, student evaluations are useful yet imperfect predictors of teacher
quality and survey results may be confounded with factors outside the control of the
instructor.
Less research has investigated the use of student led evaluations in primary
grades. The research that has been conducted reports similarly mixed findings.
Wilkerson, Manatt, Rogers, and Maughan (2000) reported strong correlations between
student teacher evaluations and student achievement (r = .70). In their research, the
correlation between student ratings and achievement was much higher than between
principal ratings and student achievement (r = .15), confirming issues mentioned
previously with regards to the accuracy of principal evaluations. Balch (2012) reported
very different correlations. Balch reported a correlation of .30 between survey totals and
student achievement for middle school and a correlation of .22 between survey totals and
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student achievement for high school. Balch’s findings underscore a particular problem
with the use of student teacher evaluations in primary grades in which there is a negative
relationship between teacher ratings and grade level (Peterson et al., 2000). Speculating
as to the wide discrepancy between the findings from the two studies summarized above
is beyond the scope of this paper, but the range suggests that more research is needed.
There are also concerns regarding the use of the use of surveys with elementary
age children. Young children are still in the process of developing basic academic and
cognitive skills and probably have less experience with surveys in general. Even so, there
is evidence that 3rd graders prefer and understand Likert-Type items over visual analog
scales (Laerhoven, van der Zaag-Loonen, & Derkx, 2004) and that 3rd graders respond to
Likert-Type items similar to how children in older grades respond (Adelson & McCoach,
2010). There is research suggesting that variation exists in the use of and interpretation of
Likert-Type scales across cultural and ethnic groups (Bernal, Wooley, & Schensul,
1997), which may cause problems for schools with diverse demographics.
Composite Teacher Evaluation
The research summarized above indicates that while both principal and student
driven teacher evaluations are important sources of information about teacher quality,
neither appear to be free of bias or accurate enough to be used as a sole indicator of
teacher quality in high stakes scenarios. The evidence suggests that principal evaluations
in particular are unreliable and subjective. Thus, there is support for an evaluative
approach which combines different evaluative efforts into a composite framework (see
Koretz, 2008). Value-added estimation plays a central role in a composite framework
because unlike principal evaluations or student surveys, value-added models are tied

50
directly to student outcomes. The rational for combining multiple imperfect measures
into a composite indicator is supported by research on testing and measurement in other
fields. A composite measure was used by the United States Airforce to screen candidates
as potential pilots (Guilford, 1946). Researchers found that the predictive validity of their
measure could be improved by using a variety of subscales to screen candidates,
including those subscales that were not strongly associated with the latent construct of
interest. The take-away from this research is that the accuracy of high stakes decisions
can be improved in small but important degrees by considering information from
multiple, imperfect sources.
Research into the construction, use, validity and accuracy of composite measures
of teacher effectiveness combining value-added scores with other less formal methods of
evaluation are still in the early stages (see Mihaly et al., 2013; Strunk et al., 2014).
Regarding the issue of the perceived fairness of high-stakes evaluative systems, there is
tentative evidence that composite measures are perceived by teachers in a more positive
light (Balch & Koedel, 2014). With regards to the statistical problems, there is evidence
from the MET project indicating that the accuracy of value-added scores might be
improved when combined with subjective indexes of teacher quality (Kane, McCaffrey,
Miller, & Staiger, 2013). The purpose of the MET project was to investigate whether a
composite indicator of teacher quality could be used to predict a teacher’s impact on
student test scores. To investigate this possibility, the researchers first estimated teacher
quality in 2009 for a sample of elementary and middle school teachers across six school
districts using a composite measure composed of three equally weighted dimensions: a
value-added estimate, a student survey, and a standardized classroom observation.
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Students were then randomly assigned to the sample of teachers in the following year.
Estimates of teacher effectiveness were generated for the same sample of teachers in
2010 using the same composite measure. The primary interest of the study was the
relationship between the predicted student test scores generated in 2009 and the actual
student test scores obtained in 2010. A strong relationship between the predicted test
scores obtained under the non-random assignment of students to teachers and the actual
test scores obtained under randomized conditions would speak to the predictive and
ecological validity of the measurement. Kane et al. reported that a one unit change in a
teacher’s predicted effectiveness resulted in a 1.039 unit change in actual student
achievement in math. For English language arts, the reported change in actual
achievement was .697. When math and English language arts were combined, the change
in student growth corresponding to a one unit change in predicted teacher effectiveness
was .955. These findings suggest that on average, the MET composite measure nearly
predicted the impact of individual teachers on student growth. Furthermore, each
individual measure of teacher quality was less strongly associated with student growth
compared to the composite measure as a whole. The value-added estimate underestimated
student growth (1.148), whereas the observation (.807) and the student survey (.940)
overestimated student growth for the combined math and English Language arts score.
Findings form the MET project formed the theoretical basis for the current study.
The MET project demonstrated that a composite measure of teacher effectiveness could
be used to predict the impact of a teacher on student growth. This is important because
while researchers have been arguing for some time that value-added models should be
combined with other indicators of teacher quality, the MET project was one of the first
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large, well-funded studies to look at the problem empirically and in an applied setting.
Other research on the topic has been conducted investigating the relationships between
raw composite indicators (Grossman et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2011; Kane & Staiger; 2008,
Strunk et al., 2014); this research was discussed in Chapter III where it was used to
inform parametrization decisions, and methods for combining indicators through different
weighting schemes (Mihaly et al., 2013). While the theoretical focus in recent research is
important if composite measures are to be adapted for general usage, no known research
has been conducted revisiting the estimation precision problem discovered by Schochet
and Chiang (2010). Estimation precision currently limits the usefulness of value-added
models for high stakes teacher evaluation. Schochet and Chiang found that 10 to 11 years
of data would be needed to estimate teacher effects with a high degree of precision using
a conventional value-added model. The MET project demonstrated that at least on
average, a composite measure can be used to more accurately predict teacher impact on
test scores.
The purpose of the proposed study was to investigate whether a composite
measure similar to the one used in the MET project could be used to reduce the number
of years required to estimate teacher quality with a level of precision necessary for high
stakes scenarios. This question has important implications regarding the improvement
that can be expected when comparing value-added teacher evaluation to teacher
evaluation based on composite approaches.
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Chapter III
METHODOLOGY
Overview
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate the extent to which a
composite measure of teacher effectiveness could be used to increase the precision of
estimated teacher effects compared to estimates derived from a stand-alone value-added
model. To that end, two studies discussed in Chapter II informed the approach and design
outlined here in Chapter III. Schochet and Chiang (2010) simulated achievement data to
investigate the precision of value-added effects using conventional value-added
specifications. The current research design emulated the approach used by Schochet and
Chiang in order to replicate their primary finding; the finding that approximately 10 to 11
years of data are needed to estimate teacher effects under type I and type II error rates
commonly used in scientific research. For this reason, the methods reported here are
adapted from Schochet and Chiang’s simulation design. Modifications to Schochet and
Chiang’s design were made to allow for comparisons between a value-added and a
composite specification of teacher effectiveness. The goal was to investigate whether the
use of a composite measure of teacher effectiveness, such as the one used in the MET
project (Kane et al., 2013), produced comparatively fewer classification errors in a
shorter time frame. Kane et al. (2013) demonstrated that their composite measure of
teacher effectiveness more accurately predicted student achievement, on average.
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However, in order for estimates of teacher effectiveness to be used effectively and fairly
high-stakes decisions, estimates must be accurate for individual teachers. The question of
whether or not a composite measure produces more precise estimates for individuals (and
not just on average) was not addressed in the MET project and was discussed as a
limitation. The proposed study seeks to investigate the possibility that a composite
indicator of teacher effectiveness might improve precision of estimates of teacher
effectiveness for individual teachers.
Appropriateness of the
Research Design
The MET study was a large, well-funded study. The researchers were given
access to public schools and were allowed to randomize the assignment of students to
teachers and teachers to students. This was a rare opportunity that required large scale
coordination between researchers, administrators, teachers, parents and students. While a
research design with similar ecological validity and scale would be ideal for the current
research, the reality was that available resources for the current research were inadequate
to replicate the MET project on even a small scale. Instead of trying to replicate the MET
project, the current study was a Monte Carlo Simulation. Student growth data were
simulated, and two evaluation models, a value-added model and a composite measure,
were fit to the data in order to estimate teacher effectiveness. Type-I and type-II error
rates were used to compare precision.
While simulation research has less ecological validity compared to applied
research, simulation research has distinct advantages. The strength of simulation research
lies in the fact that population properties can be manipulated to investigate a range of
plausible scenarios in applied settings. In applied research, there is generally some
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population value or values of interest not known to the researcher. Population values are
estimated from a sample using statistical methods. The accuracy or appropriateness with
which desired population quantities are estimated can be difficult to determine without
knowing population values beforehand. Under simulated conditions, estimated values for
population parameters can be compared against known values for population parameters.
Consequently, simulation research is useful for testing statistical methodology under
varying conditions, constraints and limitations. For example, in Maas and Hox (2005)
simulated hierarchical data in which they manipulated the size of different clusters and
the number of observations within each cluster to investigate power associated with
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). This allowed Maas and Hox to make general
recommendations about sample size and power requirements for HLM research. With
regards to the current study, varying conditions were manipulated representing a variety
of educational contexts. Applied research was used to inform realistic parameterization.
The proposed design allowed for observations to be made regarding the possible range
with which a composite measure improves on the precision of teacher effects over standalone value-added estimates depending on educational contexts.
Organization
In general, the goal for a simulation design is to produce data similar to data
found in research and applied scenarios. Simulating perfectly realistic data is difficult and
often not possible due to the complexity of realistic data. Additionally, in a single study,
it is necessary to limit the investigative scope to a few practical considerations. Thus for
purposes of replicability, generalizability and critical review, designing and reporting
simulation based research requires rigor comparable to that of conventional research
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designs. Burton, Altman, Royston and Holder (2006) discussed a list of elements needed
for conducting and reporting on simulation research. These elements are summarized
here with the intention of providing an organizational framework for the methods
presented in Chapter III.
1) Aims and objectives should be specified for clarity and to ensure unique
contributions to scholarship
2) For purposes of replicability, software, versions and seed values should be
detailed
3) Simulation procedures should be explained. The number of replications should be
discussed and as well as methods for comparing simulation fidelity across
independently generated data sets.
4) Justification should be discussed regarding choices driving parameterization.
Realistic data are the goal, so choices made by the researcher should reflect that
goal. Arbitrary parameterization has the potential to limit generalizability of
results.
5) Scenarios for investigation should be discussed. Possible scenarios for
investigation include sample size, omitted variables, etc.
6) Criteria for making methodological comparisons should be discussed. Where
possible, multiple criteria should be used.
7) Methods for collecting and storing estimates should be discussed. Simulation
research often involves thousands of replications. Extraction and storage of
estimates must be automated, otherwise simulation research would not be
practical.
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Simulation Procedure
Software
The simulation was written in R version 3.2.2. R-studio version 0.99.484, an
integrated development environment (IDE), was also used at all stages of development.
An IDE is a development tool which combines many useful functions for coding and
debugging. R is an open-source programming language widely used for statistical
applications operated using a command line console (R Core Team, 2014). A basic
installation of R provides access to a host of built-in functions, scripts used to perform
computations on a set of arguments. R base functionality can be expanded by installing
open source packages. Packages are available to download from the Comprehensive R
Archive Network (CRAN). For this simulation, the package MASS version 7.3-37 was
used to generate multivariate normal distributions with known covariance structures. The
package lme4 version 1.1-7 was used to fit an HLM model to the data. A seed value of
456 will be used.
Data Simulation
For purposes of replicability and because simulation research requires the use of
simplifying assumptions, it is important that details are specified regarding the simulation
of data (Burton et al., 2006). For the current study, simulated data were meant to
represent student gain scores across two consecutive standardized assessments which are
perfectly vertically aligned. Value-added effects were computed by fitting a hierarchichal
linear model (HLM) to the simulated data. Principal observation ratings and studentteacher evaluations were simulated, and composite scores for individual teachers was
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computed by averaging across composite variables. Details regarding simulation process
and assumptions used to guide the process are discussed below.
Generating distributions of teacher evaluation variables. For convenience, the
simulation procedure is illustrated in Appendix A. The first stage in the simulation
involved generating distributions for value-added scores, teacher observational ratings
and student-teacher evaluations. Distributions of teacher evaluation variables were
assumed to be standard normal. A congeneric factor structure was used to generate
indicator variables. It was assumed that the three variables loaded onto a single factor
representing teacher quality or effectiveness. This assumption was supported by recent
research which indicated that different indicators of teacher quality assess some
overlapping and some unique variance in teacher quality (Strunk et al., 2014). The factor
model was specified as:
𝑥𝑥 = Λ𝑓𝑓 + 𝑒𝑒

where 𝑥𝑥 represented observed scores on the three variables, Λ represented a vector of

factor loadings between the three variables and teacher quality, 𝑓𝑓 represented a vector of

iid ~ N(0, 1) latent factor scores, and e represented a matrix of independently distributed
measurement errors.
Factor loadings were determined a priori by relying on research which

investigated the relationships between the three teacher evaluation variables. Choices and
rational regarding parameterization were discussed in proceeding sections. x was created
by randomly generating a multivariate normal distribution with the specified correlation
structure. Multivariate distributions were generated using the mvrnorm function in r.
Once generated, 𝑥𝑥 was a N x 3 matrix in which columns represented evaluation variables,
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and N was the number of teachers in the data set. The three variables were designated as
𝑓𝑓1 , 𝑓𝑓2 and 𝑓𝑓3 . 𝑓𝑓1 was used to represent teachers’ true contribution to student learning

(value-added), 𝑓𝑓2 represented the distribution of true scores from principal evaluations,

and 𝑓𝑓3 represented the distribution of true scores for student-teacher evaluations. For the

current study, error was generated as the unique proportion of variance at different levels
within the data (student-level, teacher-level, etc.). This process was discussed in detail
below. Because error was introduced later in the simulation process, 𝑒𝑒 was set to zero
such that the distribution 𝑥𝑥 represented true variation in the composite outcome.
Generating gain scores. Student gain scores were generated using the

hierarchical population model used by Schochet and Chiang (2010). The purpose of using
a modified version of Schochet and Chiang’s design was to replicate their finding that
several years of data would be needed to estimate teacher effects with adequate levels of
precision. Schochet and Chiang generated achievement data using a four-level
hierarchical framework:
Level 1: Student:
Level 2: Class:
Level 3: Teacher:
Level 4: Schools:

𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘

Student growth was represented by the gain score 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for student i, in class t, by teacher

j, in school k. 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , and 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 are random intercepts. 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 was the average gain score for
a student within a given class, teacher and school. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 ) random
error term representing individual student deviations from 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 . 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the average

student growth for a given teacher within a school. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 ) deviation
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of teacher j from average student achievement within school k. 𝛿𝛿 was average student

achievement across schools, and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 ) was the deviation from the average
for school k. The population model is more simply expressed in a single combined
equation where student gain is modeled as average student gain plus the combined
deviations from the mean across each school, teacher, class and student:
Combined:

𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

The interpretation of the combined model is that student gains are the sum of the fixed
effect 𝛿𝛿, representing average student gain within a district, and four random effects

representing deviations from the norm at the school, 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 , teacher, 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , class, 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , and

student, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , levels

Simulating data using the model above involved three steps. First 𝛿𝛿 was set to

zero. Using zero for average student gains allowed for easy interpretation. Values

generated above zero represented student gains above the average and values generated
below zero represented student gains below the average. Next, independent normal
distributions were generated for 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 , 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The function rnorm in r was used for
this purpose. rnorm generates random normal distributions of a given mean and standard
deviation as specified by the user. Variances 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 , 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 , and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 were set to the same

values used by Schochet and Chiang. Schochet and Chiang reviewed research within the
last ten years to determine realistic proportions of variance in student gains at student,
class, teacher and school levels. The specific values of 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 , 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 , and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 were

discussed in the section on parameterization. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was generated in the prior step. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is
analogous to 𝑓𝑓1 and represented the deviation from the average gain score for students

belonging to teacher j within school k. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 can be thought of as the teacher’s contributions
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to student growth (value-added). Generating 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 in the prior step was necessary because it
allowed for the distribution of teacher value-added scores to be correlated with the other
teacher evaluation variables. The variance of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 , was rescaled to match the

parameterization used by Schochet and Chiang. Once the distributions for all of the
random effects were generated, student gain scores were generated by simply finding the
sum of the scalar value 𝛿𝛿 and the vectors 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 , 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

Several assumptions were made for purposes of simplicity. The same assumptions

were made by Schochet and Chiang. The number of students within each classroom was
assumed to be the same across teachers. It was assumed that there was no teacher
mobility between schools. It was assumed that achievement measurement were perfectly
scaled across grades allowing for comparisons of teachers at different grade levels.
Finally, it was assumed that students were randomly assigned to schools and to teachers.
Due to the fact that these assumptions are simplifications, results from the current study
were interpreted as best case. Contextually, this meant that the expected accuracy of
classification rates is likely worse in applied settings compared to the results derived
from the current study.
Generating principal observation scores. Principal observation scores were
generated using a similar hierarchical model. There were only two levels are relevant to
principal evaluations scores:
Level 1: Teacher:
Level 2: Schools:

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘

While variation in principle evaluation scores exists between classes taught by the same
teacher, between teachers, and between principals, it was assumed that principal
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evaluations are not generally averaged across classes taught by the same teacher. For this
reason, principal evaluation scores were generated using the teacher level as the lowest
level of analysis. Note that the same multilevel notation used in the previous section is
used here to avoid using overly complicated notation. With regards to principal
evaluations scores, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was interpreted as an evaluation score for teacher j at school k. 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘
was the average evaluation score for teachers at school k. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the deviation from the

average for teacher j at school k and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 ). 𝛿𝛿 was the district
average and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 was the deviation from the district average assumed to be iid ~ N(0,
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 ).

The distribution 𝑓𝑓2 , generated in the previous step, was rescaled and used as 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 .

For easy interpretation 𝛿𝛿 and 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 were set to zero. This will mean that scores above or

below zero represented principal evaluation scores above or below the average. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and

𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 were generated as normal distributions with variance components 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 . The

parameterization of 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 was discussed in a section below. Principal evaluation
scores for teacher j within school k can be modeled using the combined formula:
Combined:

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 )

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was generated as the sum of the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 .
Generating student-teacher evaluation scores. Student-teacher evaluation

scores were generated using the same four-level population model used to generate
student gains scores:

Level 1: Student:
Level 2: Class:

𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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Level 3: Teacher:
Level 4: Schools:

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘

Again, for purposes of simple notation, the notation used here is identical to the notation
used above. 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the evaluation score given by student i within class t for

teacher j within school k. 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 was the average evaluation given by class t for teacher j

within school k. 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the average evaluation given to teacher j across 1…t classes, and
𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 was the average evaluation given by students to teachers within school k. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 were random terms. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the deviation from the average student
evaluation 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 for student i and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 ). 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 represented the

deviation from the average evaluation given to teacher j for class t and was assumed to be
iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 ) . 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 represented the deviation from the average evaluation given to

teachers within school k and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 ). Finally, 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 was the

deviation from the district average for school k and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 ).

𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , the deviation from average student-teacher evaluation scores within a school, was

equivalent to 𝑓𝑓3 , generated in the previous step. 𝑓𝑓3 was used for 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 but was rescaled such

that the ratio between the variance of random terms (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 ) was

equivalent to the ratio discussed in the section below. 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was generated as the sum of

the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 :
Combined:

𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )
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Parameterization
In simulation research, choices must be made with regards to the parametrization
of known population values. Parameters are characteristics of a population which are
estimated in applied research. Regression coefficients, for example, are parameters
representing relationships between variables in a research sample. In simulation research,
values for population parameters are determined by the researcher. Sample data are
generated using these known population parameters and statistical methods are applied to
generated data sets in order to attempt to recover known population parameters. By using
different methods with the same sampled data sets, researchers can draw conclusions
about the relative effectiveness of different methods under varying data conditions.
Conditions are used in simulation research to compare the use of statistical
methods across a variety possible settings in applied research. Conditions used to
compare methods vary across simulation studies. Simulation research has been used to
investigate variation in sample size (Mass & Hox, 2005), violations of normality
assumptions (Mass & Hox, 2004), and the impact of missing data on estimated
parameters (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). Varying parameters and data conditions allows for
the investigation of a range of plausible scenarios relevant to applied problems.
Conditions and parameterization for the proposed study were discussed in the following
section. For convenience, a summary of the proposed conditions is reported below in
Table 1. Methods used to compare conditions were discussed in a subsequent section.
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Table 1
Simulated Conditions
Condition
Sample size
Number of teachers within a sample
Number of schools within a district
Alpha level
Factor loadings
𝑓𝑓1
𝑓𝑓2
𝑓𝑓3
Evaluation scheme

Condition 1

Condition 2

Condition 3

4
10
.01

12
50
.05

----.10

0
0
0
Within

.37
.27
.59
Between

.84
.62
.84
---

Note. All conditions are fully crossed resulting in 72 total conditions
Parameterization for Teacher
Evaluation Distributions
The first class of parameters used in the current study were the factor loadings
between teacher effectiveness, the latent characteristic of interest, and the three teacher
evaluation distributions 𝑓𝑓1 , 𝑓𝑓2 , and 𝑓𝑓3 . Values for factor loadings were determined by

reviewing recent research on the relationship between teacher evaluation variables (see
Grossman et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2012; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008; Kane et al., 2013;
Milanowski, 2004; Wilkerson et al., 2000). In recent research, correlations ranging from
.10 to .52 were reported between various principal evaluation measures and value-added
scores. Correlations ranging from .22 to .70 were reported between student-teacher
evaluations and value-added scores. Correlations ranging from .16 to .52 were reported
between principal and student-teacher evaluations. Note that highly standardized
observational measures were used across the research reviewed, and in some cases, raters
were given training in their use prior to data collection. It was assumed that there is
substantial variation in practice regarding the quality of the rating instrument used for
teacher evaluation. For this reason, a range of correlations will be used in the proposed
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study in order to investigate a range of plausible correlations between teacher evaluation
variables which depend on the quality of the observational scheme.
Three conditions were used in the current study. In the first condition, the
correlation between composite indicators was set to zero. In the second condition, lower
bound estimates of the inter-correlations determined factor loadings. Factor loadings
were set to .37, .27 and .59 for 𝑓𝑓1 , 𝑓𝑓2 , and 𝑓𝑓3 respectively. In the third condition, upper

bound estimates of the inter-correlations were used to determine factor loadings. In this
third condition, factor loadings were set to .84, .62, and .84 for 𝑓𝑓1 , 𝑓𝑓2 , and 𝑓𝑓3 .
Parameterization of
Student-Gain
Scores

The second class of parameters used in the current study were the distributions of
the random components. The ratio of the variance between random components
influences estimation precision. For example, the precision of the estimated teacher
value-added scores, 𝜏𝜏̂𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 , decreases as the magnitude of the variation in student gain

scores between students, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 , increases relative to the total variation in student gain

scores. With regards to the generation of value-added scores, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 represented variation in
student gain scores between students, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 represented variation in student gain scores

between classes taught by the same teacher, 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 , represented variation in student gain

scores between teachers, and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 represented variation in student gain scores between
schools in the same district. Total variation in gain scores was the sum of the four
variance components:
Total variation:

𝜎𝜎 2 = 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜀𝜀 + 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 + 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓
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The ratio between variance components is expressed as an intra-class correlation (ICC).
An ICC is a ratio comparing outcome variance at a single level of analysis to the total
outcome variation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002):
ICC:

𝜎𝜎

�𝜌𝜌 = 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙

𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

ICCs are a useful way to express the percentage of outcome variation existing at each
level within the data. With regards to student gain scores, there were four ICCs, one for
each level within the data. These ICCs represented the percentage of variation in student
gain scores existing at the student, classroom, teacher and school levels respectively:
Level 1: Student:
Level 2: Class:
Level 3: Teacher:
Level 4: Schools:

𝜌𝜌�𝜀𝜀 = 𝜎𝜎

𝜎𝜎2 𝜀𝜀

𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝜎𝜎2 𝜔𝜔

𝜌𝜌�𝜔𝜔 = 𝜎𝜎

𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝜎𝜎2 𝜃𝜃

𝜌𝜌�𝜃𝜃 = 𝜎𝜎

𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝜌𝜌�𝜓𝜓 =

𝜎𝜎2 𝜓𝜓

𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

Schochet and Chiang reviewed research from the last ten years to in order to determine
realistic ICCs to use when generating student gain scores. The current study used the
values chosen by Schochet and Chiang in order to reproduce their key findings and to
ensure that realistic parameters were in the generation process. Schochet and Chiang
found that the greatest amount of variation in student gain scores existed at the student
level (𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀 = .92). Less variation was observed at the class level (𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔 = .03), the teacher
level (𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃 = .035), and at the school level (𝜌𝜌𝜓𝜓 = .011). There is consensus among

researchers that variation in student growth is explained primarily by differences between
students (Harris, 2011). This is the chief reason for why large sample sizes are needed to
estimate variation in student growth at teacher or school levels. The ICCs specified above
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were used to proportion variance in student gain scores across student, class, teacher and
school levels.
Parameterization of Principal
Evaluation Scores
Principal evaluations scores were generated using a two-level model. The ratio
between random variance terms 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 represented the ratio of variance in

principal evaluation scores existing between teachers and between principals. In order to
generate realistic principal evaluation data, this ratio needed to reflect values observed in
practice. While recent research has been conducted investigating several facets of
principal evaluations (e.g., reliability, relation to other teacher evaluation methods), only
one study was found that considered variability in principal evaluations both between and
within principals. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) asked whether principal evaluations could be
used to identify effective teachers. They collected principal evaluation data using a selfauthored rating scale and compared teacher ratings to value-added scores. Mean centered
evaluation scores were roughly normally distributed with a standard deviation of 1.36.
Unfortunately, specific figures were not provided detailing heterogeneity across
principals. They did mention that while “…there was some heterogeneity across
principals, the ratings are generally high,” indicating that a greater amount of variation in
principle evaluation scores existed within than between principals. This observation is
consistent with the work of Tucker (1997), who dubbed the tendency among principals to
rate teachers above average as the “Lake Wobegon Effect.”
Given the lack of precise estimates for the variability in principal evaluation
scores existing between and within principals, a rough guess was used for the current
study. The guiding assumption was that a greater amount of variation existed within than
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between principals. Thus, .75 was used for the estimated ratio between 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜓𝜓 (i.e.,

𝜎𝜎 2 𝜃𝜃 accounted for 75 percent of the total variation in principal evaluation scores).
Parameterization of Student
Teacher Evaluation Scores

No known research has compared variation in student-teacher evaluations across
educational levels in primary grades. For this reason, it was difficult to determine realistic
parametrization for generating student-teacher evaluation scores. Variation parameters
used to generate student gain scores were used as rough approximations of the variation
in student-evaluation scores across student, class, teacher and school levels. Because so
much variation in student gain scores existed at the student level, this rough
approximation for student-teacher evaluation scores served as a worst case scenario.
Thus, the values for the variation parameters used in the current study to generate
student-teacher evaluation scores was 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀 = .92 at the student level, 𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔 = .03 at the class

level, 𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃 = .035 at the teacher level, and 𝜌𝜌𝜓𝜓 = .011 and the school level.
Sample Size

Sample size played an important role in the current study. The number of students
per class, n, the number of teachers per schools, j, and the number of schools per district,
k, influences estimated precision. Schochet and Chiang used survey data from 2004 to
choose realistic values for the number of students, teachers and schools when generating
data. Values more representative of Colorado schools were used in the current study.
According to the National Center for Educational statistics (2008), the median class size
for elementary teachers teaching in self-contained classes in Colorado is 21.2. This value
was rounded down such that 21 was be used for n. The number of teachers who can be
evaluated within a school depends on the earliest grade in which standardized assessment
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is given to students. According to the Colorado Department of Education (2015), the
PARCC assessment will be administered to students beginning in the 3rd grade. If
assuming that most elementary schools include a sixth grade, this means teachers from
the 4th, 5th and 6th grades can be evaluated using student achievement growth. According
to the National Center for Educational Statistics (2000), the average elementary school
size in Colorado is 386. Assuming there are roughly 21 students per teacher, this means
that the average school in Colorado has 18.4 teachers. When divided across grades, there
are 2.62 teachers per grade. Based on these figures, the number of teachers per school, j,
was set to 8 for an average school to fit the assumption of assessing three grades. To
investigate precision for both small and for large schools, j was set to values of 4 and 12.
The number of schools per districts varies widely across Colorado districts. To
investigate estimated precision across small and large districts k was set to values of 10
and 50.
Estimating Parameters
Once data have been generated, the next step in a typical methodological
simulation is to model the data using statistical methods of interest. The difference
between estimated and known population parameters allows for inferences about the
accuracy and bias of different statistical procedures under varying data conditions. The
primary methodological comparison for the current study was between teacher estimates
derived from a stand-alone value-added model and a composite measure. Relative
precision of the two approaches was compared.
Two schemes for evaluating teachers were used to determine teacher evaluations
across both methodological approaches. These were the same two schemes used by
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Schochet and Chiang. In the first scheme, teachers were evaluated within schools. When
comparing teachers within schools, variation between schools is ignored. Some have
argued that this approach is generally more fair as teachers are less likely to be held
accountable for instructional and contextual differences between schools which influence
student outcomes (Ladd, 2008; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). On the other hand,
sample size is a limitation which makes comparisons within schools more difficult.
Therefore, comparisons of teachers between schools is common in practice. Estimation
methods was crossed with evaluative schemes. Teacher effectiveness was estimated
within and between schools using value-added scores and composite scores. Refer to
Table 1 for an overview of the conditions for the proposed study.
Method 1: Estimating Teacher
Effectiveness Using
Value-Added Scores
The teacher value-added effect was 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was average gain score for students

belonging to teacher j within school k and can be expressed in the following combined
equation:
Value-added between schools: 𝜏𝜏̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 )

When comparing teachers between schools, the parameter used to estimate 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the

sum of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 . 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 was the deviation from the average student gain score for teacher
j within school k, and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 was the deviation from the average student gain score for

school k. When comparing teachers within a school, 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 can be ignored because there is
only one school, and there is no need to account for variation in student gain scores

between schools. The equation for comparing teachers within schools can be expressed
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more simply as 𝜏𝜏̂𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 . The parameter used to estimate 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 was 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 , which simply
represented deviation from the average student gains within a school for teacher j.

Once data were generated, a hierarchical linear model (HLM) was fit to the data
in order to estimate the parameters described above. Specifically, an HLM was fit in
order to estimate the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 necessary for

computing teacher value-added scores across the two evaluative schemes. The HLM
described here is a general model used in practice to estimate teacher value-added effects.
Specification of more complex models is possible (see McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz,
Louis, & Hamilton, 2004), but the current model served as a baseline for assessing the
research goals. Below, HLM models are specified with regards to the two evaluative
schemes:
Value-added between schools: 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )
Value-added within schools: 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

A single level linear regression only allows for the estimation of a single random term. If
a single level linear regression were fit to the data, variation in gain scores at the class
level, 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , the teacher level 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , and at the school level, 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 , would be lumped into the
single random term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . A detailed description of HLM is beyond the scope of this

paper. For a detailed coverage see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). For purposes of the
current study, the advantage of using HLM to estimate teacher effects was that HLM
allowed for the separate estimation of variation at different levels within the data. The
random effect 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 was isolated for comparing teachers within a school, and the sum of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

and 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 was isolated for comparing teachers between schools. This would not have been

possible using conventional regression models.
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Method 2: Estimating Teacher
Effectiveness Using a
Composite Measure
Estimating teacher effectiveness using a composite measure involved an
additional step. Value-added scores were estimated for comparing teachers within and
between schools using the procedure outline in the preceding section. Value-added scores
were combined with principal evaluation scores and student-teacher evaluation scores. It
was assumed that raw scores are frequently used in practice when evaluating teachers
using either principal evaluations or student-teacher evaluations. For this reason, a HLM
was not fit to the generated principal evaluation data or the student-teacher evaluation
data. The average of the raw scores for both the principal evaluations and for the studentteacher evaluations was standardized and used as estimates of teacher effectiveness:
Within schools:
Between schools:

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 −𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 −𝜏𝜏..
𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓

Using the estimates above, composite scores for each teacher were computed as the linear
sum of the three evaluation variables. Note that no weights were used in the linear sum.
Prior research has shown that value-added estimates and subjective teacher evaluations
measure different aspects of teacher effectiveness and that equal weighting is optimal if
the goal is to estimate more than just the effect of the teacher on achievement scores
(Mihaly et al, 2013). Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus on how to weight different
indicators of teacher effectiveness within a composite measure (Hanover, 2013).
Methodological Comparisons
The primary interest of the current study involved the comparative precision of
estimates derived from a stand-alone value added model and a composite measure fit to
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the same data. To get at this, the precision of the two approaches was compared using the
same generated data. Precision was computed for the null hypothesis that each teacher
was significantly different than the school or district average (depending evaluation
scheme) with regards to student gains or with regards to the composite outcome. Using
cutoff values discussed below, type I and type II error rates were computed for each
method and compared.
Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis that was tested for each teacher is analogous to a z-test in which a
z-scores is computed as the difference between two means divided by an estimate of the
standard error:
𝑧𝑧 =

𝑥𝑥̅1 − 𝑥𝑥̅2
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Z-scores are often used to test the hypothesis that an observed value is different than zero
or some other value of interest. In the context of the current study, conceptually, these zscores were meant to test whether a teacher was significantly different with regards to
average student gains or with regards to the average composite outcome.
The z-score equation specified above is general and was further specified for the
current study. When comparing teachers within schools, 𝑥𝑥̅1 is equivalent to 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (average
student growth for students belonging to teacher j within school k). The test case 𝑥𝑥̅ 2 is
equivalent to 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 , average student growth within school k. Using this notation the null
hypothesis states that 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is not different than 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 :

𝐻𝐻0 : 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 = 0
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The null hypothesis was tested against the alternative that average student growth for
teacher j is different than the average student growth within school k:
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 : 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0

The formula for standard error was slightly more complicated due to the fact that the data
were generated using a clustered design. Within an HLM framework, fixed effects can be
estimated using traditional ordinary least squares regression (OLS), but often, they are
estimated using the Empirical Bayes (EB) method. This is mentioned here because the
computation of standard errors depends on the estimation method. A technical description
of EB estimation is beyond the scope of the current paper (see Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002), but the basic concept is explained. The advantage of EB estimation over more
traditional ordinary least squares estimation is that estimates with poor reliability are
“shrunk” to the grand mean. Shrinkage reduces sampling error in a clustered design when
sample size for certain clusters is low. The advantage from a policy perspective is that
estimates for individual teachers are more conservative, especially when there are not
many students in a classroom. Conservative estimation in value-added contexts means
that type-I errors are controlled but at the cost of increased type-II errors. In other words,
when using EB estimation, fewer teachers are expected to be incorrectly identified as
significantly above or below the average, but a greater number of teachers significantly
above or below the average are expected to be incorrectly identified as average. Schochet
and Chiang compared type-I and type-II error rates using both OLS and EB estimation.
OLS estimation were used for the current study because OLS estimation provided a more
direct method for combining value-added scores into a composite measure of teacher
effectiveness.
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Schochet and Chiang used the following formula to estimate standard errors for a
clustered design:
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ��

𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 𝜎𝜎 2 𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚 − 1
+
�(
)
𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚

Here 𝑐𝑐 is the number of years included in the analysis (or number of classes per teacher),
n is the number of students per class per teacher, and m is the number of teachers per
school. 𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 and 𝜎𝜎 2 𝑒𝑒 have the same interpretation as before and are the variation in

student growth at the class and student levels respectively. Thus, individual z-scores for
comparing the null and alternative hypotheses were computed using the following
formula:
𝑧𝑧𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

(𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The scheme to compare teachers across schools was slightly different. Average growth
for teacher j within school k was compared against the average growth within a district:
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.. = 0

𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 : 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.. ≠ 0

𝜏𝜏.. was used to designate average student growth within a district. The formula for the z-

score was as follows:

where:

𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = ��

(𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏.. )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 𝜎𝜎 2 𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 1
+
�(
)
𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Here s stood for the number of schools in the group to be compared.
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Methodologically, the current study deviated from the study by Schochet and
Chiang in that the current study included two conditions, one in which teacher
effectiveness was estimated using value-added scores and one in which teacher
effectiveness was estimated using a composite measure. The methods described above
were used to compute z-scores for the value-added model.
When comparing teachers within school using the composite measure, the null
hypothesis is the presumption that the composite score for teacher j within school k is not
different than the average composite score for a teacher within school k. The alternative
hypothesis is that the composite score for teacher j within school k is different than the
average composite score within school k:
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 0

𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 : 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0

The hypotheses was tested using the following z-score formula:
𝑧𝑧𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

(𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) − (𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘 + 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 are the raw scores for the teacher and student-teacher evaluation scores

respectively, and 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 and 𝜏𝜏.𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 are the average teacher and student-teacher evaluation

scores within school k. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a pooled standard deviation for the composite scores.
To estimate the standard error for the composite measure, the Satterthwaite

Approximation was used. The Satterhwaite Approximation is a method for pooling
standard errors across variables with unequal variance. The following formula was used
to compute z-scores for comparing teachers within schools:
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ��

𝜎𝜎 2 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 𝜎𝜎 2 𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚 − 1
+
(
)� + �
�+�
�
𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚

The first bracketed term is the standard error of the value-added estimate. The second and
third terms are the standard errors of the principal evaluations and student-teacher
evaluations respectively. The following hypotheses were tested when comparing teachers
across schools using the composite measure:
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 0

𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 : 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≠ 0

𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the average composite score for teachers across the district. Z-scores were

computed using the following formula:
𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =

(𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) − (𝜏𝜏.. + 𝜏𝜏..𝑝𝑝 + 𝜏𝜏..𝑠𝑠 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏

Here 𝜏𝜏.. is the average student growth for all teachers across a district, 𝜏𝜏..𝑝𝑝 is the average
principal evaluation for all teachers across a district, and 𝜏𝜏..𝑠𝑠 is the average student

evaluation for all teachers across a district. The following formula was used to compute
standard errors for composite between schools measure:

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
Error Rates

𝜎𝜎 2 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜎𝜎 2 𝜔𝜔 𝜎𝜎 2 𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 1
= ��
+
(
)� + �
�+�
�
𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Type I error rates were computed to determine the precision of the two methods.
The following methods for computing error rates mirror the methods used by Schochet
and Chiang. In the context of current study, a type-I error is a false positive with regards
to two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, a type-I error is when an above average
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teacher is incorrectly classified as significantly below average and in need of special
assistance. In the second scenario, a false-positive is when a teacher who is below
average is incorrectly classified as significantly above average. False positives have both
ethical and financial consequences in evaluative contexts. Resources are wasted on
teachers incorrectly identified as needing assistance or remediation, and there is the
ethical concern associated with labeling above average teachers as underperforming.
The assumption was made that the probability of a teacher q standard deviations
above the average being classified as below average is the same as a teacher q standard
deviations below the average being classified as above average. For this reason, error
rates were computed for one-tailed tests. As a teacher’s true-value added moves away
from average, the probability of a false-positive decreases. The probability of incorrectly
classifying a truly average teacher as above or below average is equal to the type-I error
rate 𝛼𝛼. Error rates using three different alpha values (.01, .05 and .10) were compared as a
methodological condition. Schochet and Chiang used the following formula to compute
the false-positive rate for any teacher q standard deviations (in gain score units) away
from the mean:
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞) = 1 − 𝜙𝜙(𝜙𝜙 −1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) +

𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

Here 𝜙𝜙 is the standard normal function, 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation for the population

distribution of gain scores (𝜎𝜎 = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 + 𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔 + 𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃 + 𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓 ), and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is a distribution specific

standard error. When computing the false-positive rate for value-added scores, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 was
equal to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 depending on which scheme was being used

(comparing teachers between or within schools). When computing the false-positive rate
for the composite measure, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 was equal to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 . The
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overall false-positive rate was computed representing the average false-positive rate for a
distribution of teachers q standard deviations above average. Using a standard deviation
of 𝜎𝜎𝑞𝑞 =

𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃
𝜎𝜎

(the assumed standard deviation of teacher value-added effects within

schools) for q when comparing teachers within-schools and a standard deviation of 𝜎𝜎𝑞𝑞 =
𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃 +𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓
𝜎𝜎

(the assumed standard-deviation of teacher value-added effects between schools)

for q when comparing teachers between schools, the overall false-positive rate was
simulated by generating 1000 values for q where q > 0, by computing the false-positive
rate for each draw, and by averaging across false-positive rates. To compute the overallfalse positive rate for composite scores the same procedure was used except that q was
generated using the standard deviation of the composite scores.
Type-II error rates were also used to compare the precision of the two methods. A
type-II error is a false-negative in which a teacher below average is incorrectly identified
as average. Type-II errors are arguably a more significant problem if assuming a central
goal of value-added evaluation is to identify and remove underperforming teachers (see
Hanushek, 2009). By replacing underperforming teachers with average teachers,
Hanushek argued that long-term student gains could be improved dramatically, but such a
scheme depends heavily on the accuracy with which underperforming teachers are
identified. Schochet and Chiang computed false-negative rates for teachers q standard
deviations below a performance threshold T:
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞) = 𝜙𝜙(𝜙𝜙 −1 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) +

𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

Overall false-negative rates for a population of teachers q standard deviations below
performance threshold T were computed by generating 1000 values for q in which q < T,
by computing the false negative rate for each draw of q, and by averaging across false-
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negative rates. The type-II error rate was equal to (1- 𝛽𝛽) where 𝛽𝛽 was the statistical

power. 𝛽𝛽 can be interpreted as the percentage of time a significant difference will be
observed when comparing teachers who are different by a magnitude of T minus the
average in gain score units.
Schochet and Chiang determined that a .2 standard deviation change in student
gain scores corresponded to a .932 standard deviation increase in teacher-value added.
Using the assumed distribution of value-added effects, a .932 increase in value-added is
analogous to the difference between a teacher who contributed to student learning at the
50th percentile and a teacher who contributed at the 82nd percentile (or the 18th percentile).
Because Hanushek argued that teachers in the 10th percentile should be identified and
replaced, the current study used a slightly different performance threshold T than was
used by Schochet and Chiang. A threshold value of .275 was used for the current study.
A difference of .275 standard deviations in student gain scores between teachers is equal
to a 1.28 standard deviation difference between teacher effects. A difference of 1.28
standard deviations between teacher effects is analogous to the difference between a
teacher in the 50th percentile and a teacher in the 10th percentile with regards to student
gains.
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Chapter IV
RESULTS
Overview

In total, there were 72 fully crossed conditions. Conditions included in this
simulation included varying number of teachers per school, varying number of schools
per district, varying evaluation schemes (i.e., within or between school teacher
comparisons), varying correlations between composite indicators, and varying levels of
alpha. To manage the complexity of the simulation design, results within conditions were
reported in which values across other conditions had been held constant. This approach
allowed for observations to made about trends in the changes in error rates corresponding
to changes in values within a condition. The primary limitation associated with this
approach is that interactions between conditions were not investigated. This potential
drawback is discussed as an important limitation in Chapter V. Unless otherwise
specified, combined type I and type II error rates were reported. The choice was made to
report the sum of the two error rates due to the fact that there was little variation in the
change in type-I and type-II error rates across the two evaluation designs or conditions
with one exception. Type-I and type-II error rates changed at different rates when varying
the designated alpha level. For this reason, type-I and type-II error rates are analyzed
within separate subsections within the alpha condition.
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Inferential comparisons of combined error rates within conditions were conducted
by using analysis of variance and Tukey post-hoc analysis were applicable. Descriptive
support was conducted by creating plots depicting changes in error rates across increasing
evaluation cycles. Plots depicting the change in combined error rates across all possible
conditional crossings are available in Appendix B. Tables were generated summarizing
the trends discussed below and referenced within this chapter. Code used to generate
descriptive tables and graphs in R is provided in Appendix C.
Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that the number of evaluation cycles needed to estimate
teacher effectiveness using nominal error rates would be less when using a composite
measure of teacher effectiveness compared to a basic, stand-alone value-added model.
This hypothesis was evaluated by examining trends in the combined error rates of the two
models as the number of evaluation cycles increased. The research hypothesis was
evaluated separately for each condition within unique subsections below. Error rates for
the both the value-added model and the composite measure were investigated and
compared. The investigation of changes in the combined error rates across evaluation
cycles within conditions allowed for a conditional interpretation of the research
hypothesis. Put differently, this approach provided insight into the probable conditions
necessary in order accept or reject the research hypothesis. The benefit of this approach is
that implications for practice can be discussed with regards to a range of plausible
settings in education. General patterns, themes and implications are discussed in more
detail in Chapter V.

84
Descriptive Analysis
Trends in error rates across the two evaluative models were analyzed
descriptively using plots generated in R. A unique plot was generated for each
conditional crossing in which combined error rates were plotted against successive
evaluation cycles for each model. Note that because so many plots were generated, only a
sample was included here in order to provide a quick visual reference (see appendix A).
All plots have been made available in Appendix B.
Several trends can be noted from the plots. First, error rates for the composite
measure were lower than error rates for the stand alone value-added model during earlier
cycles. Error rates tended to decline more quickly for the value-added model than for the
composite measure as additional cycles were used to estimate teacher effects. This means
that while the error rates were lower initially for the composite measure, there was a
“crossing-over” in which the error rates of the two models were equal at some number of
evaluation cycles. Refer to Figure 1 where this “crossing-over” is illustrated for four
different conditional crossings. This cross-over occurred at different locations depending
on the simulated conditions. The crossing-over tended to occur earlier when sample size
was large and when there was no correlation between composite indicators. When sample
size was small and when there was a moderate to strong relationship between composite
indicators, the crossing-over occurred after a greater number of evaluation cycles.
Further, the chosen alpha level appeared to influence the cross-over point as well. Error
rates for the value-added model appeared to decline more quickly when using less
conservative alpha levels. This means that the cross-over point occurred earlier in time
when alpha levels of .05 or .10 were used.
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Figure 1. Error Rate by Evaluation Cycle
Error rates across the two models were compared inferentially in the following
sections. Within each section, a separate analysis is reported in which variation in error
rates across levels of a single condition were investigated. This approach provided insight
into the various circumstances that impact the “cross-over” point observed in the
descriptive plots. This allowed for a nuanced treatment of the research hypothesis which
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.
Between and Within School Evaluative Schemes
Combined error rates across the two teacher evaluation models was evaluated
when comparing teachers between and within schools. The number of teachers was held
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constant at 12, the correlation between indicators for the composite measure was held at a
moderate level and the alpha value used for hypothesis testing was held at a .05 level.
There was not a significant difference in the combined error rates of the value added
model F(1, 13,998) = 1.73, p = .19, or the composite measure F(1, 13,998) = 1.16, p =
.28, when comparing error rates estimated for 10 and for 50 schools. This finding
indicated that there was a strong diminishing benefit to the estimated precision of teacher
effects associated with sample size increases beyond a threshold. In this scenario, the
sample size increased from 120 teachers to 600 teachers when the district size increased
from 10 to 50 schools. This finding is consistent with long-standing principles about the
diminishing impact of increasing sample size on statistical precision in more general
contexts (Thompson, 2012).
Combined errors were also compared for estimates formed using between versus
within school samples of teachers. A district size of ten schools was used for this
analysis. There was a significant difference in the combined errors when comparing
estimates derived from a between versus a within school sample for both the value-added
model F(1, 13,998) = 224.47, p < .001, and for the composite measure F(1, 13,998) =
28.05, p < .001. In this scenario, there was an increase from 12 teachers to 120 achieved
when pooling teachers across schools. This finding indicated that within even smaller
districts, a significant increase in the precision of teacher effects can be achieved when
pooling teachers across schools. The average improvement was around 6.5% for the
value-added model and around 3.4% for the composite measure. It is worth noting that
the magnitude of the reduction in error rates achieved through pooling was roughly half
for the composite measure compared to the value-added model.
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To evaluate the research hypothesis, error rates for the two models were
compared when considering between school and within school evaluative approaches.
The difference in the average error rates of the value-added and the composite measure
was significant when comparing teachers between schools using a sample of 10 schools
F(1, 13,998) = 9.93, p = .001, and when using a sample of 50 schools F(1, 13,998) =
5.87, p =.02. The difference in average combined errors of the two models was also
significant when conducting evaluations using within school samples of teachers F(1,
13,998) = 81.27, p < .001. These analyses confirmed that the moderately correlated
composite measure had lower error rates on average than the value-added model for both
evaluative schemes.
The magnitude of the difference in error rates between the two models was
greater when comparing teachers within rather than between schools. This was especially
evident after examining means and standard deviations (for greater detail refer to Table
2). When comparing teachers between schools using a sample of ten schools, average
combined error rate for the value-added model was .113 (SD = .069). For the composite
measure, the average was .099 (SD = .041). When comparing teachers within schools the
average combined error rate for the value-added model was .179 (SD = .095). For the
composite measure, the average was .131 (SD = .043). Importantly, these findings
suggest that reductions in combined errors associated with the composite measure are
greatest when sample sizes are small (i.e., when comparing teachers within schools).
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Table 2
Average Combined Error Rates by Scheme and Model
Evaluation
Cycle
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

1

Number of Schools in Sample
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
10
50
1
10

.342
.265
.189
.155
.121
.100
.080
.179 (.095)

.231
.176
.120
.096
.071
.057
.042
.113 (.069)

.222
.170
.118
.090
.063
.051
.039
.108 (.068)

.193
.171
.150
.130
.110
.091
.072
.131 (.043)

.180
.144
.108
.096
.084
.070
.057
.106 (.043)

50

.168
.136
.103
.091
.078
.065
.053
.099 (.041)

Sample of Teachers
Combined error rates were evaluated when estimating teacher effects using two
different samples of teachers per schools. In the smaller of the two samples, error rates
were generated when using a sample of 4 teachers per school. In the larger of the two
samples, error rates were generated using 12 teachers per school. These values were
selected to reflect small and large elementary schools in Colorado. Only teachers in the
fourth, fifth and sixth grades were included in sample size estimates due to the fact that
standardized testing does not start until the third grade for Colorado students.
For this analysis, the number of schools was held constant at 10. This choice was
justified based on the finding above in which average combined error rates did not
significantly vary across samples of 10 and 50 schools. The alpha level was held constant
at .05, and the correlation between composite indicators was held constant at a moderate
level. There was not a significant difference in the combined error rates of either the
value-added, F(1, 13,998) = .59, p = .44, or the composite measure, F(1, 13,998) = 0.01,
p = .03, when comparing teachers from a pooled sample of 10 large versus 10 small
schools. This finding is similar to the findings from above. Increasing sample sizes from
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40 to 120 teachers did not significantly impact average combined error rates for either
model. This was treated as further evidence that there is a diminishing benefit to
estimation precision for both models.
Error rates were also evaluated for within school comparisons using different
sample sizes of teachers. There was a significant difference in the combined error rates
for both the value-added model, F(1, 13,998) = 66.99, p = < .001, and the composite
measure F(1, 13,998) = 23.25, p < .001, when comparing teachers within a small versus a
large school. The average combined error rate of the value added model was .226 (SD =
.100) when using a sample of 4 teachers, and the average was .179 (SD = .095) when
there were 12 teachers in the sample. For the composite measure, the average combined
error rate was .165 (SD = .044) when there were 4 teachers in the sample and .131 (SD =
.042) These findings confirmed that significantly fewer classification errors were made
when using a within group sample of teachers from a relatively large versus a relatively
small school. This finding was true for both models. It is also noted that the magnitude of
the difference in average error rates when comparing small versus large within group
samples is larger for the value-added model than for the composite measure.
The primary hypothesis was evaluated by comparing error rates across the two
models for both the small and large samples teachers. There was a significant difference
in the average combined error rates of the value-added and the composite measure when
comparing teachers between schools using a sample of 4 teachers per schools F(1,
13,998) = 428.86, p < .001, and when using a sample of 12 teachers per schools, F(1,
13,998) = 419.60, p < .001. Likewise, there was a significant difference in the average
combined errors of the two models when comparing teachers within schools using a
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sample of 4 teachers, F(1, 13,998) = 631.59, p < .001, and when using a sample of 12
teachers, F(1, 13,998) = 666.81, p < .001. These findings confirmed that on average, the
composite measure produced significantly fewer errors than the stand-alone value-added
model across both large and small samples of teachers.
Descriptive statistics were generated to evaluate the magnitude of the difference
in error rates across the two models. Descriptive statistics reported here are also
summarized in Table 3a and Table 3b below. When comparing teachers between schools,
the average combined error rate for the value-added model was .113 (SD = .069) when
using a sample of 4 teachers per school and .110 (SD = .067) when using a sample of 12
teachers. The average combined error for the value-added model was .099 (SD = .041)
for the composite measure when using a sample of 4 teachers per school and .098 (SD =
.034) when using a sample of 12 teachers. In short, the moderately correlated composite
measure produced somewhere between 1.1% to 1.5% fewer errors than a stand-alone
value-added model using the same sample of teachers for the between school evaluative
scheme.
Table 3a
Average Combined Error Rates by Sample and Model (Between Schools)
Number of Teachers in Sample
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
Evaluation Cycle
4
12
4
12
3
.232
.222
.168
.166
4
.176
.172
.135
.130
5
.120
.121
.103
.093
6
.095
.938
.090
.085
7
.071
.662
.077
.076
8
.056
.535
.065
.069
9
.042
.042
.052
.062
Mean (SD)
.113 (.069)
.110 (.067)
.099 (.041)
.098 (.034)
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When comparing evaluations within schools, the averaged combined error rate for
the value-added model was .226 (SD = .100) when using a sample of 4 teachers and .179
(SD = .095) when using a sample of 12 teachers. The average combined error rate was
.165 (SD = .043) for the composite model when using a sample of 4 teachers and .131
(SD = .043) when using a sample of 4 teachers. For the within school evaluative scheme,
the moderately correlated composite measured produced 4.8% to 6.1% fewer errors than
the value-added model using the same sample of teachers.
Table 3b
Average Combined Error Rates by Sample and Model (Within Schools)
Number of Teachers in Sample
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
Evaluation Cycle
4
12
4
12
3
.386
.341
.228
.193
4
.319
.265
.207
.171
5
.252
.188
.187
.149
6
.209
.154
.159
.129
7
.165
.120
.131
.110
8
.137
.100
.125
.091
9
.109
.079
.119
.072
Mean (SD)
.226 (.100)
.179 (.094)
.165 (.043)
.131 (.043)
In short, the composite measure had significantly fewer average combined errors
when using either a small or large sample of teachers per school, but the difference was
much larger when conducting within school comparisons. Assuming the results
summarized above generalize to practice, somewhere between 1 to 2 additional teachers
out of every 100 who were underperforming (i.e., belonging in the 10th percentile) would
be correctly identified using the composite measure every evaluation cycles when
conducting between school comparisons. When conducting within school comparisons,
around 1 additional teacher out of every 20 that were underperforming would be correctly
identified after every five cycles.
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Correlation Between Indicators
In a third condition, the correlation between composite indicators was varied.
Values for the correlations were chosen by drawing from applied research. Three levels
were used in the simulation. For the first level, indicators were uncorrelated. For the
second and third levels, indicators were assigned a moderate and a high level of
correlation relative to values observed in applied research. The intent behind varying the
magnitude of the relationship between composite indicators was to estimate a plausible
range of errors that might be expected for a composite model depending on the actual
relationship between indicators.
For this analysis, a sample size of 4 teachers and 10 schools was used. Alpha was
held constant at .05. As would be expected, there was no difference in the combined error
rates for the value-added model across varying levels of correlation between composite
indicators when comparing teachers between, F(2, 20,997) = 1.86, p = .155, or within
schools F(2, 20,997) = 0.47, p = .62. There was a significant difference in the error rates
for the composite model across the three levels of correlation when comparing teachers
between, F(2, 20,997) = 6.52, p = .001, and within schools, F(2, 20,997) = 15.32, p <
.001. This confirmed that the level of correlation between composite indicators
significantly impacted average combined error rates for the composite measure.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted comparing the combined error rates derived
from the value-added model and the three levels of the composite measure to better
understand the differences and where they were occurring. The omnibus f-test was
significant for the between school evaluation scheme F(3, 27996) = 8.74, p < .001. A
post-hoc analysis was conducted using Tukey’s range test. Table 3 summarizes the
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results of the post-hoc analysis. A significant difference in the average combined error
rates was found between the value-added model and the composite model when there was
a moderate or a high correlation between indicators. When there was no correlation, the
difference in average combined error rates between the value-added model and the
composite measure was not significant. Further, there was a significant difference
between the combined errors of the no correlation condition and the moderate and high
conditions but no difference between the moderate and high condition. These findings
indicated that the relationship between composite indicators significantly impacted error
rates for the composite measure. There was a difference in the average error rates of the
value-added model and the composite measure when the indicators were at least
moderately correlated.
Somewhat dissimilar results were found when conducting comparisons within
rather than between schools. The omnibus test was significant, F(3, 27996) = 121.27, p <
.001. Using the Tukey method for post-hoc analysis, significant differences in error rates
were observed between the value-added model and all three levels of correlation for the
composite measure. In the prior between school analysis, there was no difference
between the error rates of the value-added model and the uncorrelated composite
measure. Here, the difference was significant. There was a significant difference in the
combined errors of the no correlation condition and the moderate and high conditions, but
no difference between the moderate and high conditions.
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Table 4
Tukey Range Test
Difference
Between
VA – 1
VA – 2
VA – 3
1–2
1–3
2–3

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

p-value

.003
.020
.024
.016
.020
.004

-.010
.005
.009
.001
.005
-.010

.018
.035
.039
.031
.035
.018

.906
.002*
< .001*
.022*
.001*
.885

.044
.044
.085
.028
.040
.012

.025
.025
.066
.010
.022
-.006

.062
.062
.103
.047
.059
.030

< .001*
< .001*
< .001*
< .001*
< .001*
.323

Within
VA – 1
VA – 2
VA – 3
1–2
1–3
2–3

Note. Values of 1, 2, and 3 were used to denote the uncorrelated, moderately correlated
and highly correlated composite measures respectively. Significance is denoted with a *
at a p < .05 level.
The magnitude of the difference in error rates across levels of correlation between
composite indicators was investigated. Refer to Tables 5a and 5b for a summary of the
values reported below. Values are reported for the between school analysis first. The
difference in average error rates for the value-added model (M = .1184, SD = .0712) and
the uncorrelated composite measure (M = .1124, SD = .0494) were negligible. The
difference was more substantial when compared to the moderately correlated (M = .0979,
SD = .0374) and the highly correlated (M = .0843, SD = .0369) composite measures.
These values indicated that with at least a moderate correlation between composite
indictors, somewhere between 1.85% to 3.2% fewer classification errors were made using
a composite measure to compare teachers between schools.

95
Table 5a
Averaged Combined Error Rates by Indicator Correlation (Between Schools)
Value-Added Model
Composite Measure
Evaluation cycle
Low
Mid
High
3
.241
.195
.168
.163
4
.184
.157
.135
.123
5
.127
.119
.103
.083
6
.100
.100
.090
.074
7
.073
.081
.077
.065
8
.059
.071
.065
.061
9
.044
.060
.052
.056
Mean (SD)
.118 (.071)
.112 (.049) .097 (.037) .084 (.036)
When comparing teachers within schools, the magnitude of the difference in
average error rates was significantly different for the value-added model (M = .2198, SD
= .0983) and the uncorrelated composite measure (M = .1747, SD = .0690). The
difference was also significant when comparing the error rates of the value-added model
to the moderately correlated composite measure (M = .1655, SD = .0432) and the highly
correlated composite measure (M =.1370, SD = .0390). Somewhere between 4.6% and
8.3% fewer errors were made using the composite measure to compare teachers within
schools. Importantly, these findings imply that when sample sizes are very small and
when using five or fewer aggregated evaluation cycles, an uncorrelated composite
measure may produce fewer classification errors than a stand-alone value-added model.
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Table 5b
Averaged Combined Error Rates by Indicator Correlation (Within Schools)
Value-Added Model
Composite Measure
Evaluation cycle
Low
Mid
High
3
.380
.294
.228
.199
4
.310
.238
.207
.127
5
.241
.182
.187
.146
6
.201
.149
.159
.131
7
.161
.117
.131
.117
8
.134
.118
.125
.103
9
.108
.120
.119
.088
Mean (SD)
.219 (.098)
.174 (.068) .165 (.043) .137 (.039)
Alpha Value
A final condition was included in the simulation for comparing error rates when
using different alpha levels. Three levels were included in the simulation representing
values often chosen in scientific research. The values chosen for alpha were .01, .05 and
.10.
A type-I error is when the null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. Within the
context of this research, a type-I error is when a teacher above average was misclassified
as performing significantly below average. The reverse case in which a teacher below
average was classified as significantly above average was also a type-I error. A type-II
error is when the null hypothesis is incorrectly accepted. Within the context of this
research, a type-II error was when a teacher significantly below average was
misclassified as average. Teachers significantly below average were operationalized as
those in the 10th percentile or below on the performance distribution. The 10th percentile
was chosen such that the results would relate back to Hanushek’s “teacher deselection”
argument (Hanushek, 2009). Type-II errors increase as more conservative alpha levels
are chosen. This means that by choosing a certain alpha level, a practitioner is implicitly
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weighting the importance of one error type over the other. Implications for practice are
discussed with regards to this trade-off in Chapter V.
Type-I Errors
For this analysis, the number of teachers per school was held constant at 4, the
number of schools per sample was held constant at 10, and the correlation between
indicators was held at a constant moderate level. There was a significant difference in
average type-I error rate for the value added model, F(2, 20,997) = 482.09, p < .001, and
for the composite measure, F(2, 20,997) = 128.24, p < .001, across the three alpha levels
when comparing teachers between schools. Likewise, the difference in average type-I
error rate was significant for both the value-added model F(2, 20,997) = 1005, p < .001,
and for the composite measure, F(2, 20,997) = 192.67, p < .001, when comparing
teachers within schools. This result was expected. This confirmed that type-I error rate
was impacted by the chosen alpha level for both models.
To evaluate the research hypothesis, type-I error rates were compared across the
two evaluative models at each level of alpha. Results are reported for the between school
analysis first. There were significant difference in the type-I error rates for the two
models at alpha levels of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 179.75, p < .001), .05, F(1, 13,998) =
138.66, p < .001, and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 252.82, p < .001. Likewise, there were
significant differences in the type-I error rates when comparing teachers within schools at
alpha levels of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 416.56, p < . 001, .05, F(1, 13,998) = 581.19, p < .001,
and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 605.16, p < .001. These findings confirmed that there were
different type-I error rates associated with the two evaluative models at the different
levels of alpha.
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To better understand the magnitude of the differences, descriptive statistics were
calculated. Values reported below are summarized in tables 6a and 6b. For the valueadded model and when comparing teachers between schools, the average type-I errors
were .0014 (SD = .0003) at an alpha of .01, .0085 (SD = .0010) at an alpha of .05, and
.0186 (SD = .0042) at an alpha of .10. For the composite model and when comparing
teachers between schools, the average type-I errors were .0005 (SD < .0001), at an alpha
of .01, .0039 (SD = .0004) at an alpha of .05, and .0068 (SD = .0010) at an alpha of .10.
Table 6a
Average Type-I Error Rates by Alpha Value (Between Schools)
Evaluation Cycle
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

Alpha value
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
.01
.05
.10
.01
.05
.10
.0019
.0102
.0257
.0006
.0047
.0086
.0016
.0094
.0222
.0005
.0040
.0077
.0013
.0085
.0186
.0005
.0032
.0068
.0012
.0082
.0179
.0004
.0037
.0065
.0011
.0080
.0172
.0004
.0041
.0062
.0011
.0075
.0152
.0004
.0039
.0059
.0011
.0071
.0131
.0004
.0037
.0056
.0014 (.0003)
.0085(.0010)
.0186 (.0042)
.0005 (.0001)
.0039 (.0004)
.0068 (.0010)

For the value-added model and when comparing teachers within schools, the
average type-I errors were .0022 (SD = .0004) at an alpha of .01, .0138 (SD = .0020) at
an alpha of .05, and .0300 (SD = .0042) at an alpha of .10. For the composite model and
when comparing teachers within schools, the average type-I errors were .0007 (SD =
.0002), at an alpha of .01, .0039 (SD = .0006) at an alpha of .05, and .0094 (SD = .0019)
at an alpha of .10. There are several important implications from these findings. First, the
average type-I error rate at five evaluation cycles peaked at around 3% for the valueadded model and around 1% for the composite model. Second, the variation in type-I
error rates was not substantial. Type-I errors increased marginally as the alpha value
increased for both models.
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Table 6b
Average Type-I Error Rates by Alpha Value Within Schools)
Evaluation Cycle
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

Alpha value
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
.01
.05
.10
.01
.05
.10
.0029
.0160
.0368
.0008
.0050
.0118
.0025
.0155
.0337
.0008
.0043
.0110
.0022
.0150
.0307
.0008
.0036
.0103
.0021
.0141
.0292
.0007
.0035
.0096
.0020
.0132
.0277
.0005
.0034
.0089
.0019
.0117
.0263
.0005
.0034
.0075
.0017
.0103
.0249
.0005
.0033
.0062
.0022 (.0004)
.0138 (.0020)
.0300 (.0042)
.0007 (.0002)
.0039 (.0006)
.0094 (.0019)

Type-II Errors
The data conditions used in this analyses matched the conditions used for
analyzing type-I errors. There was a significant difference in type-II error rates for the
value added model, F(2, 20,997) = 480.01, p < .001, and for the composite measure, F(2,
20,997) = 175.01, p < .001, across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers
between schools. Likewise, the difference in type-II errors were significant for the valueadded model, F(2, 20,997) = 903.43, p < .001, and for the composite measure, F(2,
20,997) 119.43, p < .001, across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers within
schools. Again, this simply confirmed that type-II errors varied with the chosen level of
alpha.
Average type-II errors for the two evaluative models were compared across the
three levels of alpha. Results are reported for the between school analysis first. There was
a significant difference in average type-II error rates between the value-added and the
composite measure at an alpha of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 22.54, p < .001. There was not a
difference in average type-II error rates when using an alpha level of .05, F(1, 13,998) =
2.45, p = .116, or an alpha level of .10, F(1, 13,998 ) = 0.71, p = .340. The lack of a
significant difference between the type-II error rates of the two models at the less
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conservative alpha levels was evaluated further. When using an alpha level of .05, there
was a significant difference between the type-II error rates for the two models at three,
F(1, 1998) = 22.65, p < .001, through five evaluation cycles, F(1, 1998) = 6.21, p = .01.
Further, there was a significant difference in type-II error rates of the two models at three,
F(1, 1998) = 7.47, p = .006, but not five, F(1, 1998) = 1.04, p = .30, evaluation cycles
when using an alpha of .10. These findings indicated that type-II error rates did not start
at the same level or change with uniformity across the two evaluation models as an
increasing number of aggregated evaluation cycles were used to estimate teacher effects.
As the alpha level became less conservative, type-II errors started at a lower point and
dropped more quickly for the value-added model than for the composite measure. This
resulted in non-significant differences starting around the sixth cycle when an alpha level
of .05 was used and around the fifth cycle when an alpha level of .10 was used. This
trend is illustrated in Figure 2 below. What this may mean is that stand-alone value-added
model benefited more from the use of less conservative alpha levels. This finding may
have interesting implications for practice and will be discussed further in Chapter V.
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Figure 2. Type-II Error Rate by Alpha Value and by Model
When comparing teachers within schools, there was a significant difference in the
average type-II error rates at alpha levels of .01, F(1 13,998) = 296.32, p <.001, .05, F(1,
13,998) = 58.45, p < .001, and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 15.78, p < .001. Unlike the trend
described above, average type-II errors were significantly different across all three levels
of alpha. The implication was that while type-II error rates dropped more quickly for the
value-added model across evaluation cycles, higher overall error rates associated with the
smaller within group samples delayed the point at which type-II errors were equal for the
two models. These findings demonstrated that (a) type-II error rates varied with alpha
levels as was expected, and (b) the average type-II error rate of change varied across

102
models. When the sample size was larger (i.e., when teachers were being compared using
pooled samples between schools), and when less conservative alpha levels were used,
type-II error rates for the value-added model dipped below error rates for the composite
measure using fewer evaluation cycles. When sample sizes were smaller (i.e., when
comparisons are made within schools) and when more conservative alpha levels were
used, type-II error rates for the value-added model dipped below error rates for the
composite measure using more evaluation cycles.
Descriptive statistics were computed to better understand the changes in type-II
error rates by model and by alpha level. The between school error rates are discussed
first. The average type-II error rate for the value-added model was .2264 (SD = .1138) at
an alpha level of .01, .1015 (SD = .0657) at an alpha level of .05, and .0661 (SD = .0466)
at an alpha level of .10. The average type-II error rate for the composite measure was
.1860 (SD = .0690) at an alpha level of .01, .0939 (SD = .0370) at an alpha level of .05,
and .0639 (SD = .0295) at an alpha level of .10.
Table 7a
Average Type-II Error Rates by Alpha Value Between Schools)
Cycle
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

Alpha value
Value-added Model
Composite Measure
.01
.05
.10
.01
.05
.10
.408
.212
.146
.304
.161
.115
.333
.162
.108
.249
.126
.089
.257
.112
.071
.196
.090
.063
.205
.085
.053
.167
.081
.056
.153
.058
.034
.142
.072
.050
.126
.045
.027
.128
.065
.040
.099
.033
.020
.115
.059
.030
.226 (.114) .102 (.066) .066 (.047)
.186 (.069) .094 (.037) .064 (.030)

There were significantly fewer type-II errors associated with the composite model
when there were fewer evaluation cycles used in the analysis. As the number of
evaluation cycles increased, the type-II error rate for the value-added model dropped
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more rapidly than for the composite model. Depending on the other data conditions, the
value-added model had a lower error rate than the composite measure somewhere
between the fifth and eighth evaluation cycle. Again, refer back to Figure 1 for depiction
of this general trend.
Descriptive statistics were also computed for the within school comparison.
Average type-II error rates were significantly lower for the composite model than for the
value-added model across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers within
schools (i.e., when sample size is small). Refer to Table 7b below for more information.
The average type-II error rate for the value-added model was .4000 (SD = .1253) at an
alpha level of .01, .2120 (SD = .0983) at an alpha level of .05 and .1368 (SD = .0726) at
an alpha level of .10. The average type-II error rate for the composite model was .2401
(SD = .0683) at an alpha level of .01, .1616 (SD = .0426) at an alpha level of .05, and
.1174 (SD = .0447) at an alpha level of .10.
Table 7b
Average Type-II Error Rates by Alpha Value (Within Schools)
Alpha value
Evaluation Cycle
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

Value-added Model
.01
.05
.584
.370
.516
.303
.449
.237
.391
.194
.334
.152
.285
.125
.236
.099
.400 (.125)
.212 (.098)

.10
.266
.204
.151
.121
.090
.074
.058
.137 (.073)

Composite Measure
.05
.349
.222
.305
.203
.260
.183
.226
.155
.191
.127
.179
.121
.168
.115
.241 (.068)
.162 (.043)
.01

.10
.184
.160
.136
.111
.087
.076
.065
.117 (.045)

Type-II error rate dropped more quickly for the value-added model than for the
composite model across successive evaluation cycles. When comparing teacher between
rather than within schools, the point at which the error rates for the two models were
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equal occurred later. When using an alpha of .05, the error rates for the two models were
equal somewhere between the eighth and ninth cycles, depending on data conditions.
These findings confirmed that the chosen alpha value impacted the rate at which
teachers in the 10th percentile of the performance distribution were incorrectly classified
as average. When using an alpha value of .01, around 20% to 40% of teachers in the 10th
percentile were incorrectly classified as average on average using the stand-alone valueadded model. Using the same alpha level, around 18% to 25% of underperforming
teachers were misclassified using the composite model on average. Misclassification
rates were significantly lower for both models when using a less conservative alpha.
Using an alpha level of .10, around 7% to 14% of teachers in the 10th percentile were
misclassified for the value-added model, and around 6% to 11% of teachers in the 10th
percentile were misclassified as average for the composite model. It is important to note
that the drop-off in type-II errors was much more dramatic than the increases in type-I
errors associated when using less conservative alpha levels. Whereas type-I errors
increased by around 1% to 3% depending on the model, type-II errors dropped by around
15% to 20%, depending on the model.
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Chapter V
DISCUSSION
Overview
The primary hypothesis of this study was that a composite measure could be used
to estimate teacher effectiveness with lower error rates than a conventional value-added
model in the same time frame. This hypothesis was evaluated using simulated data which
were parameterized using varying conditions in order to represent a variety of educational
contexts. Two models were fit to the data in order to estimate teacher effects: a simple
stand-alone value-added model and a composite measure. Error rates were computed for
the two models and compared. The hypothesis was supported in some but not all of the
simulated conditions. Discussion provided below focuses on when one might expect error
rates to be lower for the composite measure than for the value-added model based on the
results. Trends in the change in error rates across evaluation cycles is emphasized.
General Trends
General trends in error rates across the two models are discussed in this section.
More detailed discussions regarding changes in error rates across simulated conditions
are provided in proceeding sections. As a general comment, the generalizability of these
findings depends largely on the extent to which simulated conditions reflect real world
data. Simulated data were necessarily simplistic and several assumptions are made. For
this reason, implications are discussed as trends that can be expected in practice but may
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not hold as circumstances between the simulation and the applied scenario become more
disparate. Other limitations are discussed near the end of this chapter.
Combined error rates decreased as the number of evaluation cycles increased.
This was true for both the value-added model and for the composite measure. For
reference, this trend is illustrated in the plots provided in Appendix B. Error rates are
expected to decrease as the amount of data used to estimate teacher effects increases. The
first important trend observed was that the composite measure tended to produce fewer
errors than the value-added model when fewer evaluation cycles were used to estimate
teacher effects. The magnitude of the differences depended on data conditions, but in
general, the improvement was greater when smaller sample sizes were used. A second
important trend was that error rates decline more rapidly for the value-added model than
for the composite measure as addition evaluation cycles were included in the evaluation.
This means that while there tended to be fewer errors associated with the
composite measure when using fewer aggregated evaluation cycles, the value-added
model produced fewer errors as the amount of available data reached a certain threshold.
The exact threshold depended on the various simulated conditions but ranged between
four and nine evaluation cycles. This finding has practical importance. A composite
measure may be more accurate when few evaluation cycles are aggregated or when
sample size is small. All things being equal, the use of fewer evaluation cycles is
favorable from an evaluative perspective. When using fewer evaluation cycles, quicker
evaluation windows allow for more regular impact, and fewer assumptions are made
about the communicability of aggregated data across cycles. One important consideration
is that while the evidence seemed to indicate that a composite measure may be used to
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reduce combined errors when using fewer evaluation cycles, a composite measure also
requires greater resources to implement. The amount of time and effort required to
implement a composite measure increases as the number of teachers being evaluated also
increases (assuming in-class observations are used as part of the measure). The same is
not necessarily true for a stand-alone value-added model which can be implemented
procedurally. From a practical standpoint, the need to control error rates must be weighed
against availability of resources for implementing a composite measure.
It is important to note that while the error rates for the composite measure where
lower than for the value-added model during earlier evaluation cycles, it is not clear
whether error rates were low enough to be used for high-stakes evaluation system.
Speculations about the exact error threshold necessary for high-stakes evaluations is
beyond the scope of this study. Even so, at three evaluation cycles, the composite
measure averaged around 41% combined errors in the worst data conditions and around
12.5% in the most favorable data conditions. The practical implication may be that for
high-stakes evaluation systems, neither approach provides adequately precise estimates in
a reasonable window. This finding has implications for Hanushek’s “teacher deselection”
argument (Hanushek, 2009). Hanushek argued that by identifying and then by replacing
teachers in the lowest 10th percentile of performance with average teachers, the quality of
education could be improved dramatically within a short window. This argument assumes
that teachers in the lowest 10th percentile can be identified objectively and accurately.
The evidence from this study indicated that even under very favorable conditions and
when using a composite measure to evaluate teachers, somewhere around 10% of
teachers in the lowest 10th percentile would be misclassified when using data aggregated
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from three evaluation cycles. Assuming more typical conditions, the number may be
closer to 25%. Given that the majority of errors were type-II, the implication is that
somewhere between one in ten and one in four poorly performing teachers would go
unidentified in a typical evaluation window. This may not mean that Hanushek’s reform
would fail. Rather, the implication is that the impact of Hanushek’s or a similar reform
effort is optimistic. Errors in classification would increase the time required before
reform efforts could produce noteworthy improvements.
Another important trend observed was that while the use of additional evaluation
cycles improved precision for both models, this improvement was less for the composite
than for the value-added model. At a certain point, it may be advisable to use a standalone value-added model if the goal is to maximize estimation precision and resource
allocation. The point at which the value-added model produced lower error rates than the
composite measure varied across the simulated conditions. The threshold occurred later
when data conditions were poor (i.e., smaller sample sizes and comparisons within
schools) and when indicators were highly correlated. The threshold occurred at an earlier
point when data conditions were more favorable (i.e., larger sample sizes and
comparisons between schools) and when composite indicators where uncorrelated. These
themes are discussed in greater detail in the sections below where trends in error rates are
discussed for each simulated condition.
If assuming a moderate correlation between indicators, the implication is that a
composite measure may produce fewer classification errors when using smaller sample
sizes and fewer evaluation cycles. When using a larger sample size and more evaluation
cycles, the benefit of using a composite measure decreases, especially when also taking
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into consideration the additional resources required for implementation. In summary, the
evidence indicated that a composite measure could be used to reduce combined error
rates when indicators are moderately correlated and when fewer evaluation cycles are
used to compare teachers. In this way the primary hypothesis was conditionally
supported. Practically, the implication is that modeling choices are nuanced even when
prioritizing combined errors and should depend on several additional factors. Modeling
choice should depend on: a) the nature and availability of the data for evaluating teachers
(i.e., sample size), b) the number of intended evaluation cycles to be included, c)
reasonability about assumptions regarding the relationships between composite
indicators, and d) the availability of administrative resources needed for implementing
resource intensive measures.
The discussion in the proceeding sections is organized around the various
simulated conditions. Error rates across the two models are discussed with regards to
variation in the levels simulated for each condition. Potential implications are drawn for
practice.
Correlation Between Indicators
Three levels were simulated representing different levels of correlation between
composite indicators. Composite indicators were generated to have no correlation, to
have a moderate correlation and to have a high correlation. It was found that the level of
correlation between indicators significantly impacted combined error rates for the
composite measure. When there was no correlation, error rates were significantly higher
than if there was either a moderate or high correlation. When comparing the value-added
model to the three variations of the composite measure, it was found that the value-added
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model had higher error rates when there were fewer evaluation cycles. As the number of
evaluation cycles increased, the error rates for the value-added model eventually dipped
lower than all three variations of the composite model. Importantly, this “crossing-over”
occurred earlier for the composite measure where indicators were uncorrelated. For the
uncorrelated condition, the crossing-over occurred at around four evaluation cycles when
comparing teachers between schools and at around six evaluation cycles when comparing
teachers within schools. For the moderately correlated condition, this crossing over did
not occur until around six evaluation cycles when comparing teachers between schools
and not until around nine evaluation cycles when comparing teachers within schools.
Several implications can be drawn from these findings. The first important
implication is that the error rates for the value-added model were higher than for the
uncorrelated composite measure when using only three evaluation cycles. This finding
was not expected. The implication is that under very restrictive data conditions, fewer
classification mistakes can be expected when using a composite measure, even when
indicators loading on a single dimension are completely independent from one another.
The magnitude of the difference in error rates between the uncorrelated composite
measure and the value-added model at three evaluation cycles is large enough to be of
practical significance. When comparing teachers between schools, around 7% fewer
teachers would be misclassified using the uncorrelated composite measure and around
10% fewer when comparing teachers within schools. Bearing in mind that the majority of
errors were type-II across all conditional combinations, this means that one could expect
that around 8% fewer poorly performing teachers would be misclassified as average
when using an uncorrelated composite measure estimated from data aggregated across
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three evaluation cycles. If assuming a small school, this would mean that around one
additional teacher misclassified using a value-added model would be identified as
performing in the lowest tenth percentile during a typical evaluation window (if assuming
all teachers were truly underperforming). It is important to note that the error rates for the
uncorrelated composite measure were still relatively high at around 19% for the between
school comparison and at around 25% percent for the within school comparison.
This finding is of particular importance when assuming that evaluations are rarely
conducted using more than three evaluation cycles. The practical implication is that the
precision of a composite measure is superior for realistic evaluative scenarios, even when
composite indicators are poorly correlated. When assuming some a moderate correlation,
error rates can be expected to be even lower for the composite measure.
Evaluative Scheme
Two evaluation scenarios were simulated. In the first scenario, teachers were
compared between schools. This scenario was assumed to be more typical. Comparing
between schools allows for larger sample sizes. Researchers have noted that while sample
sizes can be improved using this strategy, comparisons are less ideal as systematic
differences between resources and context may bias estimates of teacher effects
(Schochet & Chiang, 2010). For this reason, a second scenario was simulated in which
teachers were compared within schools. Simulating evaluation schemes comparing
teachers between and within schools allowed for observations to be drawn about the
trade-offs between precision and bias in the estimation of teacher effects.
The first important observation was that there was a significant difference for both
the composite measure and the value-added model in the error rates across between and
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within school comparisons. On average, combined error rates were around 5% higher in
the within school condition averaged across both evaluation models. At only three
evaluation cycles, the difference was fairly large averaging around 16% for the valueadded model and around 6% for the composite measure. Assuming average school sizes
in Colorado, these findings imply that around one in ten additional teachers will be
misclassified when conducting comparisons within rather than between schools. This
finding was expected and is consistent with the findings of Schochet and Chiang. In
short, the implication is that by pooling teachers across schools, districts can obtain a
meaningful improvement to the estimated precision of teacher effects. The decision to
pool must be weighed against concerns that pooling will introduce bias. In relatively
homogeneous districts where resources, student demographics and other factors
contributing to student growth are similar across schools, pooling will have less impact.
Future research might consider investigating the trade-off between bias and precision
introduced through pooing while considering districts with varying levels of homogeneity
across schools.
A second important observation was that there was only a marginal improvement
to error rates when comparing samples drawn from small and large districts. Put another
way, the evidence indicated that there is a diminishing benefit to precision associated
with increasingly large sample sizes provided by pooled samples in large districts.
Several implications can be drawn from this finding. First, relatively large schools may
only see a marginal improvement to error rates when pooling samples with other schools.
Predicting ideal sample sizes for within school comparisons is beyond the scope of this
study, but such research could have practical benefit. A second implication is that it
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might not be advisable to arbitrarily pool all available schools within a district. Because
there was a diminishing benefit associated within increasing sample sizes, it might be
better to form sub-pools using groupings of similar schools. These “sub-pools” would be
formed using groupings of schools deemed to be characteristically homogenous. This
strategy would reduce the amount of bias introduced through pooling while increasing
sample size up to a point at which the greatest benefit is realized.
It should be noted that the benefit of pooling was roughly half for the composite
measure compared to the value-added model. It was assumed that this was due to the fact
that the composite measure estimated teacher effects using more information than did the
value-added model. Consequently, increases to sample size impacted error rates less. The
implication is that if districts opt to conduct comparisons within schools, a composite
measure may produce lower error rates on average (assuming a moderate correlation
between indicators). Alternatively, the choice to pool may be made if opting to use a
stand-alone value added model knowing that pooling reduces error rates for a stand-alone
value added model more dramatically.
Finally, the magnitude of the reduction to errors achieved through pooling
depended on the number of evaluation cycles used to compare teachers. At nine
evaluation cycles the reduction is reduced to .037 for the value-added model and .020 for
the composite model. There was a diminishing benefit gained from pooling teachers
across schools while also aggregating an increasing number of evaluation cycles used for
teacher comparisons. The implication for practice is that additional evaluation cycles can
be incorporated into evaluation schemes for smaller districts or schools which cannot
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achieve meaningful sample sizes through pooling. This approach would trade timely
evaluation for increased evaluation precision.
Alpha Level
Schochet and Chiang did not consider the impact of varying levels of alpha on
type-I and type-II error rates. In this study, error rates were computed using alpha values
of .01, .05 and .10. It was found that there was variation in how type-I and type-II error
rates changed across varying levels of alpha. The first important finding was that the
type-I error rates remained relatively low, even when using alpha levels of .10. When
using an alpha level of .10, type-I error rates for the value-added model peaked at around
3% and around 1% for the composite measure. On the other hand, type-II errors changed
more dramatically as alpha changed. At an alpha of .01, type-II errors averaged around
22% for the value-added model and around 18% for the composite model. At an alpha of
.10 type-II errors drop to around 6% for both the value-added model and for the
composite model.
What this means for practice may depend on the varying priorities of different
evaluation systems. A system which favors identifying low performing teachers might
opt for a higher level of alpha. Alternatively, if it is a higher priority to avoid
misidentifying high performing teachers, then the evaluation system might favor a more
conservative alpha level. The important finding was that type-I and type-II errors may not
be evenly balanced with regards to the two options. Favoring to avoid type-I errors
resulted in greatly increased type-II errors. Favoring to avoid type-II errors resulted in
slightly increased type-I errors. This means that by choosing more conservative alpha
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levels, the evaluation model is prioritizing type-I errors heavily over type-II errors.
Choosing higher alpha values prioritizes the lowest possible combined error rates.
A second important finding was that the change in type-II errors across the three levels of
alpha was not the same for the value-added and for the composite measure. There was a
significant difference in the average type-II error rate between the two models at an alpha
level of .01. There was not a significant difference at alpha levels of .05 and .10. At an
alpha of .10, the average type-II error rate was roughly equal for the value-added and for
the composite measure. The was caused by a difference in the how rapidly error rates
declined across an increasing number of evaluation cycles for the two models. When
using less conservative alpha levels, type-II errors dropped more rapidly for the valueadded model than for the composite model. Depending on the data conditions, the type-II
error rate for the value-added model would drop below the error rate for the composite
model at around five to six cycles. What this means is that while the composite measure
tended to have lower error rates when using fewer cycles, the value-added model tended
to have lower error rates when using more cycles. The point at which the error rates of
the two models were equal depended on the alpha level.
To the extent that these findings generalize to practice, this means that choices
about modeling are nuanced and depend heavily on evaluative priorities and availability
of resources. For example, a school district might opt for a composite style evaluation
system if the goal is to use fewer evaluation cycles. In this scenario, the district could
choose an alpha level based on the relative importance of type-I errors weighed against
total combined errors. In a second scenario, a school district might not have the resources
to implement a composite type measure and might opt to use a stand-alone value-added
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model. To compensate for the increase to type-II errors, the district could increase the
number of aggregated evaluation cycles while using a slightly less conservative alpha
level to maximize the reduction in combined errors.
Schochet and Chiang speculated as to the priorities of different parties involved in
teacher evaluation. On one hand, administrators and parents might favor an approach
which minimizes type-II errors out of fear that underperforming teachers might slip
through the cracks. This priority is also consistent with Hanushek’s “teacher deselection
argument” which prioritizes identifying and replacing underperforming teachers. The
evidence indicated that a priority such as this would imply the use of a less conservative
alpha. The good news would be that while using a less conservative alpha, type-I errors
increase in only small degrees. Teachers, on the other hand, might be more concerned
with the possibility of being misidentified as underperforming. This concern is likely
shared by administrators fearing the possibility of legal recourse if evaluations lead to
unfair sanctions or rewards. In such cases, the evidence indicated that type-I errors could
be controlled by using more conservative alpha levels, but at the cost of greatly increased
type-II errors. Essentially, the trade-off when choosing an alpha level for both models is
between a more accurate (less conservative alpha) or a more fair (more conservative
alpha) evaluative system.
Sample Size
The number of teachers was varied to investigate error rates associated with the
value-added and the composite measure when applied to small and large schools. The
sample size of teachers for both small and large schools was determined by investigating
typical school sizes in Colorado. It was found that when comparing teachers between
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schools, there was not a significant difference in error rates when comparing districts
with all small or all large schools. This finding indicated that both models are relatively
efficient when using sample typical in Colorado. This finding may suggest that when
pooling teachers within a district, it may not be advantageous to arbitrarily pool all
teachers. Within a large district, several pools may be formed using more or less
homogenous schools in order to balance the trade-off between bias and precision.
On the other hand, there was a significant reduction in combined error rates when
conducting teacher evaluations within small versus large schools. Assuming a moderate
correlation between indicators and an alpha level of .05, the average error rates for the
value-added model was around 22% for the value-added and around 16% for the
composite measure. There are several implications based on these findings. First, error
rates were somewhat high. When conducting within school comparisons within a small
school, the evidence indicated that around one in five underperforming teachers would be
misclassified using either model even after incorporating five evaluation cycles into the
evaluation. This finding implies that small schools may need to consider pooling their
sample of teachers with other schools in order to achieve reasonable error rates.
Secondly, the composite measure produced significantly less error rates than the valueadded model under these somewhat restrictive data conditions. The implication is that if a
small school decided to conduct teacher comparisons using only a within school sample,
a composite measure would be more practically useful than a stand-alone value-added
model.
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Limitations
Several assumptions were made in the generation process in order to keep the process
manageable and reasonably accurate. Many of the assumptions revolved around limiting
real-world complexities common in applied settings. For a list of these assumptions, see
Chapter III. The consequence of making these assumptions is that the generated data
were overly simplistic compared to data used in practice. This is typical of data generated
for this type of research as the goal is often to explore methodological trends. As such,
reasonably approximated data serve the primary purpose. It is difficult to predict how
practical complexities might have influenced error rates across the two models. To
illustrate, the data were generated assuming that students do not matriculate in and out of
classes or schools. Student mobility is a practical complication which likely introduces
some amount of noise into model estimates. This effect would likely be a decrease in
precision. It was also assumed that students were randomly assigned to teachers. Lack of
random assignment may actually increase precision by increasing the amount of
variability between teachers. This would be caused by intra-correlations between students
in the same class. As such, implications drawn from this research are treated as plausible
trends while acknowledging that data were too simplistic to draw precise conclusions
about the error rates of the two models in practice.
Results were presented by investigating trends across a single condition while
holding values for other conditions constant. This approach simplified analysis and
reporting but also prevented an analysis of possible interactions between conditions. For
example, there may have been an interaction between the chosen alpha level and sample
size on error rates. Examining possibilities such as this was beyond the scope of this
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research. The primary goal was to compare error rates for a value-added and for a
composite measure across a small number of simulated conditions. It is noted here to
acknowledge that interpretations of results may have been different if interactions were
present.
Conclusion
There was evidence that under certain conditions, a composite measure estimates
teacher effects with greater precision than a value-added model. In short, error rates for
the composite measure were better under more restrictive data conditions. Such
conditions included when smaller sample sizes were used, when comparisons were made
within rather than between schools, and when fewer evaluation cycles were used to
estimate teacher effects. The implication is that the use of a composite measure can help
to compensate for less than ideal data conditions. As data conditions improved, error
rates for the stand-alone value-added model eventually dipped below error rates for the
composite measure. This means that for larger districts and for between school teacher
comparisons, the extra effort and resources required for the composite measure may have
reduced or no benefit. Future research may be conducted investigating rules of thumb that
might be useful for deciding between different teacher evaluation models. As a rough
suggestion, the data from the current study indicated that when using four or fewer
evaluation cycles for most data conditions, a composite measure will likely produce
lower error rates than a basic, stand-alone value-added approach. That said, this finding
may not hold under more realistic conditions or when comparing a collection of more
complex models.
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An additional finding which may have important implications for practice was
that the choice of alpha level when conducting teacher comparisons may be somewhat
nuanced. This was the first known study to investigate the impact of different alpha levels
on the error rates of different teacher evaluation models. The important finding was that
type-II errors changed far more dramatically across alpha levels than did type-I errors.
Type-I errors remained somewhat low, even when using less conservative alpha levels.
Type type-II errors dropped dramatically when shifting towards less conservative alpha
levels. This may mean that by choosing an alpha level for hypothesis testing, a school or
district is essentially weighing the importance of type-I errors versus combined errors.
Restated from an earlier section in this chapter, this is essentially a choice between model
fairness (conservative alpha levels) and effectiveness (less conservative alpha levels).
Here it is speculated that the choice may depend most strongly on whether the evaluation
system is tied to high or low stakes outcomes.
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GENERATION FILE
library(lme4)
library(MASS)
diss_simbetween <- function(pe = .92, pt = .03, pc = .035, ps = .011, po_t = .90, po_s =
.10, po_c = .05,
r12 = .5, r13 = .7, r23 = .5,
alpha = .05, thresh = .275,
students = 23, classes = 3, teachers = 10, schools = 5,
iters = 1) {
# Pulls se and ols variance from lmer model
se.extract <- function(model, po) {
if(po == FALSE) {
var_w <- VarCorr(model)[["cla"]][[1]] / (classes)
var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (students * classes)
#var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (((schools * teachers) - 1) / (schools *
teachers))
var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * ((schools * teachers) / ((schools * teachers) 1))
se_ols <- sqrt(var_ols)
}
if(po == TRUE) {
var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (classes)
#var_ols <- var_e * (((schools * teachers) - 1) / (schools * teachers))
var_ols <- var_e * ((schools * teachers) / ((schools * teachers) - 1))
se_ols <- 0
}
list(var_ols = var_ols, se_ols = se_ols)
}
library(MASS)
library(lme4)
stu <- 1:(students * teachers * classes * schools)
cla <- rep(1:(teachers * classes * schools), each = students)
tea <- rep(1:(teachers * schools), each = students * classes)
sch <- rep(1:schools, each = students * classes * teachers)
va_fpr <- vector()
va_fnr <- vector()
comp_fpr <- vector()
comp_fnr <- vector()
comp2_fnr <- vector()
for(i in 1:iters) {
f12 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12)
f13 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13)
f23 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23)
temp_mat <- matrix(nrow = 3, ncol = 3)
diag(temp_mat) <- c(pt, po_t, pt)
temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)] <- c(f12, f13, f23)
temp_mat[lower.tri(temp_mat)] <- temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)]
evals <- mvrnorm(teachers * schools, c(0,0,0), temp_mat)
e <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes * schools, sd = sqrt(pe))
c <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(pc))
t <- evals[,1]
s <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(ps))
sse <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes * schools, sd = sqrt(pe))
ssc <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(pc))
sst <- evals[,3]
sss <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(ps))
pot <- evals[,2]
pos <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(po_s))
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poc <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(po_c))
school <- rep(s, each = teachers * classes * students)
teacher <- rep(t, each = classes * students)
class <- rep(c, each = students)
ssschool <- rep(sss, each = teachers * classes * students)
ssteacher <- rep(sst, each = classes * students)
ssclass <- rep(ssc, each = students)
poschool <- rep(pos, each = teachers * classes)
poteacher <- rep(pot, each = classes)
growth <- e + school + teacher + class
ssurvey <- sse + ssschool + ssteacher + ssclass
pobservation <- poschool + poteacher + poc
st_observed <- data.frame(growth = growth, ssurvey = ssurvey, pobservation =
rep(pobservation, each = classes * students),
stu = as.factor(stu), cla = as.factor(cla), tea =
as.factor(tea), sch = as.factor(sch))
te_observed <- data.frame(pobservation = pobservation, cla =
rep(as.factor(1:classes), times = teachers * schools),
tea = as.factor(rep(1:(teachers * schools), each =
classes)),
sch = as.factor(rep(1:schools, each = teachers *
classes)))
model1 <- lmer(growth ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea) + (1|sch), st_observed)
model2 <- lmer(ssurvey ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea) + (1|sch), st_observed)
model3 <- lmer(pobservation ~ (1|tea) + (1|sch), te_observed)
model1_vars <- se.extract(model1, po = FALSE)
model2_vars <- se.extract(model2, po = FALSE)
model3_vars <- se.extract(model3, po = TRUE)
comp_se <- sqrt(model1_vars$var_ols + model2_vars$var_ols + model3_vars$var_ols)
# model based standard error of comp scores
comp_var <- 2 * pt + po_t + 2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12) + 2 * (sqrt(pt) *
sqrt(pt) * r13) + 2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23) # variance of comp scores accounting
for covariances
qva_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt) + sqrt(ps))) # sqrt(pt + ps) or sqrt(pt) +
sqrt(ps), also, divide by 1?
qva_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt) + sqrt(ps))) + thresh))
qcomp_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var)))
qcomp_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + thresh))
qcomp2_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + .18))
# Three schemes
va_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qva_fpr / model1_vars$se_ols))
va_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qva_fnr / model1_vars$se_ols)
comp_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qcomp_fpr / comp_se))
comp_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp_fnr / comp_se)
comp2_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp2_fnr / comp_se)
}
list(va_fpr = va_fpr, va_fnr = va_fnr, comp_fpr = comp_fpr, comp_fnr = comp_fnr,
comp2_fnr = comp2_fnr)
}
diss_simwithin <- function(pe = .92, pt = .03, pc = .035, ps = .011, po_t = .90, po_c =
.10,
r12 = .5, r13 = .7, r23 = .5,
alpha = .05, thresh = .275,
students = 23, classes = 10, teachers = 10,
iters = 1) {
# Pulls se and ols variance from lmer model
se.extract <- function(model, po) {
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if(po == FALSE) {
var_w <- VarCorr(model)[["cla"]][[1]] / (classes)
var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (students * classes)
#var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (((teachers) - 1) / (teachers))
var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (teachers / (teachers - 1))
se_ols <- sqrt(var_ols)
}
if(po == TRUE) {
var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (classes)
#var_ols <- var_e * (((teachers) - 1) / (teachers))
var_ols <- (var_e) * (teachers / (teachers - 1))
se_ols <- 0
}
list(var_ols = var_ols, se_ols = se_ols)
}
stu <- 1:(students * teachers * classes)
cla <- rep(1:(teachers * classes), each = students)
tea <- rep(1:(teachers), each = students * classes)
va_fpr <- vector()
va_fnr <- vector()
comp_fpr <- vector()
comp_fnr <- vector()
comp2_fnr <- vector()
for(i in 1:iters) {
f12 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12)
f13 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13)
f23 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23)
temp_mat <- matrix(nrow = 3, ncol = 3)
diag(temp_mat) <- c(pt, po_t, pt)
temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)] <- c(f12, f13, f23)
temp_mat[lower.tri(temp_mat)] <- temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)]
evals <- mvrnorm(teachers, c(0,0,0), temp_mat)
e <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes, sd = sqrt(pe))
c <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(pc))
t <- evals[,1]
sse <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes, sd = sqrt(pe))
ssc <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(pc))
sst <- evals[,3]
pot <- evals[,2]
poc <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(po_c))
teacher <- rep(t, each = classes * students)
class <- rep(c, each = students)
ssteacher <- rep(sst, each = classes * students)
ssclass <- rep(ssc, each = students)
poteacher <- rep(pot, each = classes)
growth <- e + teacher + class
ssurvey <- sse + ssteacher + ssclass
pobservation <- poteacher + poc
st_observed <- data.frame(growth = growth, ssurvey = ssurvey, pobservation =
rep(pobservation, each = classes * students),
stu = as.factor(stu), cla = as.factor(cla), tea =
as.factor(tea))
te_observed <- data.frame(pobservation = pobservation, cla =
rep(as.factor(1:classes), times = teachers),
tea = as.factor(rep(1:(teachers), each = classes)))
model1 <- lmer(growth ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea), st_observed)
model2 <- lmer(ssurvey ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea), st_observed)
model3 <- lmer(pobservation ~ (1|tea), te_observed)
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model1_vars <- se.extract(model1, po = FALSE)
model2_vars <- se.extract(model2, po = FALSE)
model3_vars <- se.extract(model3, po = TRUE)
comp_se <- sqrt(model1_vars$var_ols + model2_vars$var_ols + model3_vars$var_ols)
# model based standard error of comp scores
comp_var <- (2 * pt) + po_t + (2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12)) + (2 *
(sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13)) + (2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23)) # variance of comp
scores accounting for covariances
qva_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt)))
qva_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt))) + thresh))
qcomp_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var)))
qcomp_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + thresh))
qcomp2_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + .18))
# Three schemes
va_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qva_fpr / model1_vars$se_ols))
va_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qva_fnr / model1_vars$se_ols)
comp_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qcomp_fpr / comp_se))
comp_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp_fnr / comp_se)
comp2_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp2_fnr / comp_se)
}
list(va_fpr = va_fpr, va_fnr = va_fnr, comp_fpr = comp_fpr, comp_fnr = comp_fnr,
comp2_fnr = comp2_fnr)
}

CONTROL FILE
rm(list = ls())
setwd("C:\\School\\Papers\\Dissertation")
source("C:\\School\\Papers\\Dissertation\\simulation.R")
classes <- c(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
teachers <- c(4, 12)
schools <- c(10, 50)
r12 <- c(0, .37, .84)
r13 <- c(0, .27, .62)
r23 <- c(0, .59, .84)
alpha <- c(.01, .05, .10)
iters <- 1000
# Header vector
counter = 1
headerb <- vector()
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(c in 1:length(schools)) {
for(d in 1:length(r12)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
headerb[counter] <- paste("a", a, "b", b, "c", c, "d", d, "e", e, sep
= "")
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
}
}
counter = 1
headerw <- vector()
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(d in 1:length(r12)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
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headerw[counter] <- paste("a", a, "b", b, "d", d, "e", e, sep = "")
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
}

# Simulation between
counter = 1
matb_va_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerb))
matb_va_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerb))
matb_comp_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerb))
matb_comp_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerb))
matb_comp2_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerb))
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(c in 1:length(schools)) {
for(d in 1:length(r12)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
va_fnr <- vector()
va_fpr <- vector()
comp_fnr <- vector()
comp_fpr <- vector()
comp2_fnr <- vector()
for(f in 1:iters) {
temp <- diss_simbetween(classes = classes[a], teachers =
teachers[b], schools = schools[c],
r12 = r12[d], r13 = r13[d], r23 = r23[d],
alpha = alpha[e])
va_fnr[f] <- temp$va_fnr
va_fpr[f] <- temp$va_fpr
comp_fnr[f] <- temp$comp_fnr
comp_fpr[f] <- temp$comp_fpr
comp2_fnr[f] <- temp$comp2_fnr
print(paste(paste("a", a, "b", b, "c", c, "d", d, "e", e, sep =
""), f, "between"), sep = "
")
}
matb_va_fnr[,counter] <- va_fnr
matb_va_fpr[,counter] <- va_fpr
matb_comp_fnr[,counter] <- comp_fnr
matb_comp_fpr[,counter] <- comp_fpr
matb_comp2_fnr[,counter] <- comp2_fnr
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
}
}
# Simulation within
counter = 1
matw_va_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerw))
matw_va_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerw))
matw_comp_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerw))
matw_comp_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerw))
matw_comp2_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(),
headerw))
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
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for(d in 1:length(r12)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
va_fnr <- vector()
va_fpr <- vector()
comp_fnr <- vector()
comp_fpr <- vector()
comp2_fnr <- vector()
for(f in 1:iters) {
temp <- diss_simwithin(classes = classes[a], teachers = teachers[b],
r12 = r12[d], r13 = r13[d], r23 = r23[d],
alpha = alpha[e])
va_fnr[f] <- temp$va_fnr
va_fpr[f] <- temp$va_fpr
comp_fnr[f] <- temp$comp_fnr
comp_fpr[f] <- temp$comp_fpr
comp2_fnr[f] <- temp$comp2_fnr
print(paste(paste("a", a, "b", b, "d", d, "e", e, sep = ""), f,
"with"), sep = "
")
}
matw_va_fnr[,counter] <- va_fnr
matw_va_fpr[,counter] <- va_fpr
matw_comp_fnr[,counter] <- comp_fnr
matw_comp_fpr[,counter] <- comp_fpr
matw_comp2_fnr[,counter] <- comp2_fnr
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
}
write.table(matb_va_fpr, file = "vab_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names
TRUE)
write.table(matb_va_fnr, file = "vab_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names
TRUE)
write.table(matb_comp_fpr, file = "compb_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)
write.table(matb_comp_fnr, file = "compb_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)
write.table(matb_comp2_fnr, file = "comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)
write.table(matw_va_fpr, file = "vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names
TRUE)
write.table(matw_va_fnr, file = "vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names
TRUE)
write.table(matw_comp_fpr, file = "compw_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)
write.table(matw_comp_fnr, file = "compw_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)
write.table(matw_comp2_fnr, file = "comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE,
col.names = TRUE)

=
=

=
=

ANALYSIS FILE
list(rm = ls())
setwd("C:/School/Papers/Dissertation/Simfiles")
library(foreign)
vab_fnr <- apply(read.csv("vab_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
vab_fpr <- apply(read.csv("vab_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
compb_fnr <- apply(read.csv("compb_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
compb_fpr <- apply(read.csv("compb_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, function(x) mean(x, na.rm =
TRUE))
comp2b_fnr <- apply(read.csv("comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
vaw_fnr <- apply(read.csv("vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
vaw_fpr <- apply(read.csv("vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
compw_fnr <- apply(read.csv("compw_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
compw_fpr <- apply(read.csv("compw_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
comp2w_fnr <- apply(read.csv("comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean)
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vab_fnr_inf <- read.csv("vab_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
vab_fpr_inf <- read.csv("vab_fpr.csv", sep = ",")
compb_fnr_inf <- read.csv("compb_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
compb_fpr_inf <- read.csv("compb_fpr.csv", sep = ",")
comp2b_fnr_inf <- read.csv("comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
vaw_fnr_inf <- read.csv("vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
vaw_fpr_inf <- read.csv("vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ",")
compw_fnr_inf <- read.csv("compw_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
compw_fpr_inf <- read.csv("compw_fpr.csv", sep = ",")
comp2w_fnr_inf <- read.csv("comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ",")
pullb <- function(teachers, schools, cor, alpha, classes = 4, type = "combined", inf =
FALSE) {
cycles = 1:classes
if(inf == FALSE) {
out_va <- vector()
out_comp <- vector()
out_comp2 <- vector()
for(i in 1:classes) {
search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",
"(?=.*", schools, ")",
"(?=.*", cor, ")",
"(?=.*", alpha, ")",
"(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")",
sep = "")
if(type == "combined") {
out_va[i] <- vab_fnr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
vab_fpr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compb_fnr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp2[i] <- comp2b_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2b_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
} else if(type == "negative") {
out_va[i] <- vab_fnr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compb_fnr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp2[i] <- comp2b_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2b_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
} else if(type == "positive") {
out_va[i] <- vab_fpr[grep(search, names(vab_fpr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fpr), perl= TRUE)]
comp2_mat <- out_comp
}
}
out_va <- smth(out_va)
out_comp <- smth(out_comp)
out_comp2 <- smth(out_comp2)
if(teachers == "b1") {tea = 4} else {tea = 12}
if(schools == "c1") {sch = 10} else {sch = 50}
if(cor == "d1") {cor = "low"} else if(cor == "d2") {cor = "medium"} else {cor =
"high"}
if(alpha == "e1") {alpha = .01} else if(alpha == "e2") {alpha = .05} else {alpha
= ".10"}
list(out_va = out_va, out_comp = out_comp, out_comp2 = out_comp2, tea = tea, sch
= sch, cor = cor, alpha = alpha)
} else if(inf == TRUE) {
cols<- vector()
for(i in 1:classes) {
search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",
"(?=.*", schools, ")",
"(?=.*", cor, ")",
"(?=.*", alpha, ")",
"(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")",
sep = "")
cols <- append(cols, grep(search, names(vab_fnr_inf), perl= TRUE))
}
if(type == "combined") {
va_mat <- vab_fnr_inf[,cols] + vab_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compb_fnr_inf[,cols] + compb_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp2b_fnr_inf[,cols] + compb_fpr_inf[,cols]
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} else if(type == "negative") {
va_mat <- vab_fnr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compb_fnr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp2b_fnr_inf[,cols]
} else if(type == "positive") {
va_mat <- vab_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compb_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp_mat
}
list(out_va = va_mat, out_comp = comp_mat, out_comp2 = comp2_mat)
}
}
pullw <- function(teachers, cor, alpha, classes = 4, type = "combined", inf = FALSE) {
cycles = 1:classes
if(inf == FALSE) {
out_va <- vector()
out_comp <- vector()
out_comp2 <- vector()
for(i in 1:classes) {
search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",
"(?=.*", cor, ")",
"(?=.*", alpha, ")",
"(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")",
sep = "")
if(type == "combined") {
out_va[i] <- vaw_fnr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
vaw_fpr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compw_fnr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp2[i] <- comp2w_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2w_fnr), perl= TRUE)] +
compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
} else if(type == "negative") {
out_va[i] <- vaw_fnr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compw_fnr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp2[i] <- comp2w_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2w_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
} else if(type == "positive") {
out_va[i] <- vaw_fpr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
out_comp[i] <- compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)]
comp2_mat <- out_comp
}
}
out_va <- smth(out_va)
out_comp <- smth(out_comp)
out_comp2 <- smth(out_comp2)
if(teachers == "b1") {tea = 4} else {tea = 12}
if(cor == "d1") {cor = "low"} else if(cor == "d2") {cor = "medium"} else {cor =
"high"}
if(alpha == "e1") {alpha = .01} else if(alpha == "e2") {alpha = .05} else {alpha
= ".10"}
list(out_va = out_va, out_comp = out_comp, out_comp2 = out_comp2, tea = tea, cor
= cor, alpha = alpha)
} else {
cols <- vector()
for(i in 1:classes) {
search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",
"(?=.*", cor, ")",
"(?=.*", alpha, ")",
"(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")",
sep = "")
cols <- append(cols, grep(search, names(vaw_fnr_inf), perl= TRUE))
}
if(type == "combined") {
va_mat <- vaw_fnr_inf[,cols] + vaw_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compw_fnr_inf[,cols] + compw_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp2w_fnr_inf[,cols] + compw_fpr_inf[,cols]
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} else if(type == "negative") {
va_mat <- vaw_fnr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compw_fnr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp2w_fnr_inf[,cols]
} else if(type == "positive") {
va_mat <- vaw_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp_mat <- compw_fpr_inf[,cols]
comp2_mat <- comp_mat
}
list(out_va = va_mat, out_comp = comp_mat, out_comp2 = comp2_mat)
}
}
plot_funb <- function(pull) {
plot(c(3:9), pull[[1]], type = "l", lwd = 2, lty = 1, ylab = "", xlab = "",
ylim = c(.05, .65))
mtext(paste("teachers = ", pull$tea, " ", "schools = ", pull$sch, " ", "cor = ",
pull$cor, " ", "alpha = ", pull$alpha, " ", sep = ""),cex = .70)
lines(pull[[2]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, lty = 2)
#lines(pull[[3]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, col = "blue")
legend("topright", lty = c(1,2), legend = c("VA", "Composite"))
}
plot_funw <- function(pull) {
plot(c(3:9), pull[[1]], type = "l", lwd = 2, lty = 1, ylab = "", xlab = "",
ylim = c(.05, .65))
mtext(paste("teachers = ", pull$tea, " ", "cor = ", pull$cor, " ", "alpha = ",
pull$alpha, " ", sep = ""),cex = .70)
lines(pull[[2]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, lty = 2)
#lines(pull[[3]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, col = "blue")
legend("topright", lty = c(1, 2), legend = c("VA", "Composite"))
}
smth <- function(out) {
second <- mean(c(out[1], out[2]))
fourth <- mean(c(out[2], out[3]))
sixth <- mean(c(out[3], out[4]))
out <- c(out[1], second, out[2], fourth, out[3], sixth, out[4])
out
}
plot_fun <- function() {
pdf("between.pdf")
teachers = c("b1", "b2")
schools = c("c1", "c2")
cor = c("d1", "d2", "d3")
alpha = c("e1", "e2", "e3")
par(mfrow = c(2,2))
par(mar = c(3,3,2,2))
for(b in 1:length(teachers)){
for(c in 1:length(schools)){
for(d in 1:length(cor)){
for(e in 1:length(alpha)){
pull <- pullb(teachers = teachers[b], schools = schools[c], cor =
cor[d], alpha = alpha[e])
plot_funb(pull)
}
}
}
}
dev.off()
pdf("within.pdf")
par(mfrow = c(2,2))
par(mar = c(3,3,2,2))
for(b in 1:length(teachers)){
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for(d in 1:length(cor)){
for(e in 1:length(alpha)){
pull <- pullw(teachers = teachers[b], cor = cor[d], alpha = alpha[e])
plot_funw(pull)
}
}
}
dev.off()
}
plot_pub <- function() {
teachers = c("b1", "b2")
schools = c("c1", "c2")
cor = c("d1", "d2", "d3")
alpha = c("e1", "e2", "e3")
setwd("plots")
bet <- list()
wit <- list()
counterb = 1
counterw = 1
for(b in 1:length(teachers)){
for(c in 1:length(schools)){
for(d in 1:length(cor)){
for(e in 1:length(alpha)){
bet[[counterb]] <- pullb(teachers = teachers[b], schools =
schools[c], cor = cor[d], alpha = alpha[e])
counterb = counterb + 1
}
}
}
}
for(b in 1:length(teachers)){
for(d in 1:length(cor)){
for(e in 1:length(alpha)){
for(f in 1:4) {
wit[[counterw]] <- pullw(teachers = teachers[b], cor = cor[d], alpha
= alpha[e])
counterw = counterw + 1
}
}
}
}

}

table_funb <- function(classes = 3:9, teachers = c(4, 12), schools = c(10, 50),
correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"),
alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), type = "combined") {
tea <- vector()
cla <- vector()
sch <- vector()
cor <- vector()
alp <- vector()
counter = 1
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(c in 1:length(schools)) {
for(d in 1:length(correlation)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
cla[counter] <- classes[a]
tea[counter] <- teachers[b]
sch[counter] <- schools[c]
cor[counter] <- correlation[d]
alp[counter] <- alpha[e]
counter = counter + 1
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}
}
}
}
}
out_va <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, sch = sch, cor = cor, alp = alp),
row.vars = c(1,2,4))
out_comp <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, sch = sch, cor = cor, alp = alp),
row.vars = c(1,2,4))
attr(out_va, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation
attr(out_comp, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation
options(stringsAsFactors = FALSE)
frame_classes <- data.frame(classes = 3:9, codes = 1:7)
frame_teachers <- data.frame(teachers = c(4,12), codes = c("b1", "b2"))
frame_schools <- data.frame(schools = c(10,50), codes = c("c1", "c2"))
frame_correlation <- data.frame(correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"), codes =
c("d1", "d2", "d3"))
frame_alpha <- data.frame(alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), codes = c("e1", "e2",
"e3"))
options(stringsAsFactors = TRUE)
classes <- frame_classes$codes[frame_classes$classes %in% classes]
teachers <- frame_teachers$codes[frame_teachers$teachers %in% teachers]
schools <- frame_schools$codes[frame_schools$schools %in% schools]
correlation <- frame_correlation$codes[frame_correlation$correlation %in%
correlation]
alpha <- frame_alpha$codes[frame_alpha$alpha %in% alpha]
counter = 1
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(c in 1:length(correlation)) {
line_va <- vector()
line_comp <- vector()
for(d in 1:length(schools)) {
temp_va <- vector()
temp_comp <- vector()
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
save <- pullb(teachers[b], schools[d], correlation[c], alpha[e],
type = type)
temp_va[e] <- save$out_va[classes[a]]
temp_comp[e] <- save$out_comp[classes[a]]
}
line_va <- c(line_va,temp_va)
line_comp <- c(line_comp,temp_comp)
}
out_va[counter,] <- line_va
out_comp[counter,] <- line_comp
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
list(table_va = out_va, table_comp = out_comp)
}
table_funw <- function(classes = 3:9, teachers = c(4, 12), correlation = c("Low", "Mid",
"High"), alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), type = "combined") {
tea <- vector()
cla <- vector()
sch <- vector()
cor <- vector()
alp <- vector()
counter = 1
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(teachers)) {
for(d in 1:length(correlation)) {
for(e in 1:length(alpha)) {
cla[counter] <- classes[a]
tea[counter] <- teachers[b]
cor[counter] <- correlation[d]
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alp[counter] <- alpha[e]
counter = counter + 1
}
}
}
}
out_va <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, cor = cor, alp = alp), row.vars =
c(1,3))
out_comp <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, cor = cor, alp = alp), row.vars =
c(1,3))
attr(out_va, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation
attr(out_comp, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation
options(stringsAsFactors = FALSE)
frame_classes <- data.frame(classes = 3:9, codes = 1:7)
frame_teachers <- data.frame(teachers = c(4,12), codes = c("b1", "b2"))
frame_correlation <- data.frame(correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"), codes =
c("d1", "d2", "d3"))
frame_alpha <- data.frame(alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), codes = c("e1", "e2",
"e3"))
options(stringsAsFactors = TRUE)
classes <- frame_classes$codes[frame_classes$classes %in% classes]
teachers <- frame_teachers$codes[frame_teachers$teachers %in% teachers]
correlation <- frame_correlation$codes[frame_correlation$correlation %in%
correlation]
alpha <- frame_alpha$codes[frame_alpha$alpha %in% alpha]
counter = 1
for(a in 1:length(classes)) {
for(b in 1:length(correlation)) {
line_va <- vector()
line_comp <- vector()
for(c in 1:length(teachers)) {
temp_va <- vector()
temp_comp <- vector()
for(d in 1:length(alpha)) {
save <- pullw(teachers[c], correlation[b], alpha[d], type = type)
temp_va[d] <- save$out_va[classes[a]]
temp_comp[d] <- save$out_comp[classes[a]]
}
line_va <- c(line_va, temp_va)
line_comp <- c(line_comp, temp_comp)
}
out_va[counter,] <- line_va
out_comp[counter,] <- line_comp
counter = counter + 1
}
}
list(table_va = out_va, table_comp = out_comp)
}

